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ABSTRACT 
Keyowski, Lynette R.  2004.  M.Sc.  University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, 
August 2004.  An Examination of Factors Influencing the Adoption of HT 
Canola.  Supervisor:  Dr. Murray E. Fulton 
 
This thesis develops a conceptual framework to determine the probability of 
adopting HT canola when producers are assumed heterogeneous.  The model is 
based on the framework developed by Fulton and Keyowski (1999), but is modified 
from a deterministic model to a probabilistic model.  The study also considers the 
gross returns from adopting HT canola.  Canola production in Manitoba, Canada is 
chosen as the region of analysis for the empirical component of the study. 
In 2002, 74 per cent of total canola acres in Manitoba were devoted to HT 
canola production. Factors such as soil type, producer risk profile, experience, 
productivity, and management ability are considered as potential determining 
factors which distinguish adopters of HT technology from non-adopters.   
Based on an initial assessment of Manitoba canola data, which shows the 
incomplete adoption of HT technology in Manitoba, a model is developed which 
considers adoption of a new technology as a function of the characteristics of the 
adopters.  The conceptual model is tested empirically in two-stages.  The first stage 
employs Ordinary Least Squares analysis to estimate the expected yield of different 
canola varieties to determine whether producers realize a benefit from the adoption 
of HT varieties.  A logit analysis is conducted in the second stage, and considers 
different attributes of producers – such as risk aversion, management ability, 
productivity and expected yields – to determine the probability of producers 
adopting HT technology.   
The results show two primary findings.  First, certain HT varieties can be 
shown to give producers higher returns.  Second, differentiating characteristics of 
producers are key in determining the likely adoption of HT canola. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Technological change has been a critical element of agriculture over the last 
100 years.  Innovation in the industry has been the basis for increasing agricultural 
productivity and promoting agricultural development worldwide (Schulz, 1964; 
Alston, Norton and Pardey, 1995).  The agriculture industry has benefited from 
innovation in many aspects of production, including mechanical innovation, 
biological innovation, chemical innovation, agronomic innovation and informational 
innovation.  Any new method, custom or device created to perform a new task can 
be defined as an innovation (Sunding and Zilberman, 2001).  Stoneman (2002) 
defines innovations that are created to perform new task, or that are advances in 
techniques used in production, as process innovations.  Conversely, product 
innovations are defined by technological advances in the nature and type of products 
produced.   
Of course, innovation is only successful if the innovative technology is 
adopted.  If and when a new technology is adopted depends on a wide range of 
factors faced by individual producers, including geography, time, risk preferences 
and investment requirements.  There is a vast literature surrounding adoption and 
diffusion of innovations, including Mansfield (1963); Stoneman and Ireland (1983); 
McDonald and Siegel (1986); Olmstead and Rhode (1993); Rogers (1995); and 
McWilliams and Zilberman (1996).1 
 
1 These works will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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In the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century, some of the most 
prevalent products of technological change have been the result of biotechnology – 
in particular, genetic modification of plants.  Examples of biotechnology that have 
become important in the western hemisphere include the Roundup Ready© and Bt 
technologies.   
As this thesis attempts to explain the economic impacts of an innovation, 
herbicide tolerant canola, generated from a scientific process, specifically 
biotechnology, clarification of terms needs to be made.  Science, as defined by 
Merriam-Webster (2004) is, “…the state of knowing: knowledge as distinguished 
from ignorance or misunderstanding.”  To scientists, therefore, the applicable 
definition of technology is, “…the practical application of knowledge, especially in 
a particular area.”  Hence, biotechnology – the practical application of knowledge 
“…[applied to] genetic engineering and recombinant DNA technology.”  For the 
sake of this thesis, in its explanation of the economic impacts of an innovation based 
on biotechnology, technology is defined as, “…a manner of accomplishing a task, 
especially using technical processes, methods or knowledge.”  In the case of 
herbicide tolerance, the technology is used to control weeds. 
The advent of biotechnology as an impetus for technological innovation has 
not only changed the mechanism by which new crops are developed, but has also 
diminished the amount of time it takes for new technologies to become  
commercially available.  With the advent of genetic modification (a 
biotechnological process) in the canola industry, for example, the average time to 
breed and commercially register a new variety diminished from approximately 15 
years to between 6 and 10 years, depending on the breeding method used.  In 
addition, private investment into research and development of new varieties using 
biotechnological processes has increased the number of varieties available for 
commercial trade.  With the introduction of biotechnology methods, the number of 
varieties released each year increased steadily from less than one during the years 
1985-89 to a peak of 32 registered varieties in 1996 (Phillips, 2001).  
Agricultural producers, in general, have been very receptive of 
biotechnology, and have readily adopted many of the resulting technologies.  On a 
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global scale, the area of crops derived from biotechnology has increased from 4.3 
million acres at its inception in 1996 to 167 million acres in 2003.  The United 
States is, by far, the leading producer of genetically modified (GM) crops, with 63 
per cent of this area.  Argentina and Canada follow with 21 and six per cent, 
respectively, of the total global area in production of GM crops in 2003 (James, 
2003). 
As Table 1.1 shows, the largest proportion of GM commodities grown in the 
world are either tolerant to certain herbicides, have been made resistant to particular 
insects, or display a combination of both characteristics.  Of the reasons producers 
have so readily adopted GM technologies, the cost reduction and yield 
enhancements that result from using these products appear to be at the top of the list.  
Marra, Pardey and Alston (2002) show that research on farm-level impacts in the 
United States confirms yield enhancements and reduced pesticide use in transgenic 
crops when compared to conventional varieties, with the expectation that these 
results would be paralleled in other countries. 
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Table 1.1 - Global Area of Transgenic Crops by Trait, 2000-02 (million hectares) 
Trait 2000 % Total 
Transgenic 
Acres 
2001 % Total 
Transgenic 
Acres 
2002 % Total 
Transgenic 
Acres 
Herbicide Tolerance 28.1 71 40.6 77 44.2 75 
Insect Resistance 8.9 22 7.8 15 10.1 17 
Bt/Herbicide Tolerance 2.9 7 4.2 8 4.4 8 
Virus Resistance/Other <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 <0.1 <1 
Source: Adapted from James (2000 &2002). 
 
The traits specified in Table 1.1 are predominantly agronomic traits (i.e., 
directly affect production of the commodity).  Biotechnology has also been used to 
change other criteria such as crop yield or crop quality.  In the case of canola, for 
example, biotechnology has been responsible for developing traits with respect to 
oil composition and meal quality (Khachatourians et al., 2001).   
In Canada, the predominant biotech commodity that has been adopted is 
herbicide tolerant (HT) canola.  While a large portion of the industry has adopted 
HT canola, there are a significant proportion of producers who have not.  Table 1.2 
depicts Canadian canola acres from 1996 to 2002.  Over the first four years of this 
period, Canadian acres planted to canola steadily increased, from 8.8 million acres 
in 1996 to 13.75 million acres in 1999.  Over the same period, 1996 to 1999, the 
proportion of those acres seeded to HT canola also steadily increased, from 4 per 
cent of total canola acres in 1996 to 62 per cent of total canola production in 1999.   
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Table 1.2 - Acres of Herbicide Tolerant Canola in Canada ('000s acres). 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total Canola 8,843 12,040 13,535 13,750 12,192 9,353 8,059 
Herbicide Tolerant 350 4,000 6,000 8,500 7,000 5,857 5, 930 
Per Cent of Total 4 33 44 62 57 62 74 
Source: Fulton and Keyowski (1999), James (2000, 2001 & 2002), Canola Council 
of Canada (2003) and author’s calculations. 
 
Since 1999, total area in Canada planted to canola has steadily declined, to a 
low of just over 7 million acres in 2002.  While the total number of acres seeded to 
canola has diminished, more of the producers who continue to seed canola are 
choosing to seed HT varieties, with 62 per cent of canola acres in 2001 and 74 per 
cent in 2002 devoted to growing HT canola.  
 The focus of this thesis is on producer adoption of canola varieties which 
exhibit a specific trait – herbicide tolerance (HT).  While some varieties of HT 
canola are products of biotechnology, not all HT varieties are a result of modern 
genetic modification practices.   
Alan McHughen (2000) notes that the term ‘biotechnology’, in a general 
sense, encompasses, “… any application of technology to living systems.”   While 
McHughen acknowledges that the term ‘biotechnology’ more commonly refers to 
‘modern’ technologies such as genetic engineering, it is not to be confused as a 
synonym with genetic modification, which he defines in the following manner: 
    “Genetic modification (GM), also known as genetic 
engineering or rDNA technology, is actually a collection of 
many technologies.  These begin, perhaps, with the molecular 
identification and analysis of genes and DNA.  They include 
extraction and isolation, then ‘cloning’ or multiplying fragments 
of DNA or genes.  They include gene-splicing, cutting pieces of 
DNA, and connecting together fragments from different sources.   
They also include shifting the DNA from test tube to Petri dish, 
or from bacteria to other bacteria.  They may involve subtle or 
substantial directed alteration of the DNA along the way.  They 
could also include transferring or inserting the DNA into the cell 
of a higher plant or animal, then recovering a complete new 
organism.  Only this last stage is what most of us consider when 
defining ‘genetic engineering’… 
    The application of GM techniques results in a genetically 
modified organism (GMO), also known as a transgenic or 
genetically transformed organism.” (McHughen, 2000) 
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One biotechnological process which is not described by the above definition, 
but by which the same type of results can be obtained, is mutagenesis.  In this form 
of manipulation, the genetic material of an organism is subjected to an agent which 
causes mutation to alter its genetic makeup, in anticipation of obtaining the trait of 
interest.  The mutated plant material is then selected for the desired trait. 
In the case of HT canola, varieties that are resistant to glyphosate – the 
active ingredient in the herbicide Roundup® – are selected based on rDNA 
techniques, and would therefore be considered genetically modified, herbicide 
tolerant by the above definition.  Canola varieties that are part of the Clearfield® 
system – those which are resistant to imazethypyr, the active ingredient in the 
commercial chemicals Pursuit® and Odyssey® – are selected based on mutagenesis 
techniques, and would thus be classified as non-genetically modified, herbicide 
tolerant varieties by McHughen’s definition.  
 Despite the relative acceptance of the herbicide tolerant technology (recall 
that 75 per cent of Canadian canola acres in 2002 were HT), there remains a 
significant portion of the industry that chooses to produce traditionally bred 
varieties of canola.  A cursory glance at the canola sector may potentially provide an 
explanation for the incomplete diffusion of HT canola.  
A host of issues has surrounded the canola industry with the advent of 
biotechnology.  Issues such as cross-pollination with traditional canola; the inability 
for producers to save seed, depending on the variety grown; continued adoption of 
complimentary technologies, such as zero-tillage; and the continuing skepticism of 
importing nations about the safety of GM products are all concerns that have 
affected how the producer perceives canola as a product.  Where consumer demands 
are reflected through price signals, simply the threat of a decreased price for HT 
canola (or, alternatively, the potential for a price premium for non-HT canola) may 
be enough to keep producers from using HT technology.   
Another explanation for the partial adoption of HT canola is the 
heterogeneous nature of producers.  Producers differ in terms of geographic 
location, agronomic factors, management ability and behavior under risk (Fulton 
and Keyowski, 1999).  The returns from adoption of HT canola can be quite easily 
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measured if all producers are assumed to be homogeneous in both their adoption 
and production patterns of the technology.  Relaxing this assumption of producer 
uniformity and allowing for producer differentiation in production of canola makes 
measurement of producer benefits much more difficult.  Works by David (1975) and 
others have considered the heterogeneous nature of producers in adopting new 
technologies.  To date, however, there has not been a widespread attempt to model 
the adoption of HT technology, or measure benefits derived from it under the 
assumption that producers are heterogeneous.    
The motivation for this thesis stems from the need to develop an appropriate 
conceptual model with which to: (1) determine the probability of HT adoption; and 
(2) measure the benefits to producers from producing HT canola.  Specifically, this 
thesis aims to: (a) develop a conceptual framework with which to measure the 
returns to producers from the adoption of HT canola, under the assumption that 
producers are heterogeneous in their production of the commodity; (b) empirically 
estimate the expected yields of HT and non-HT canola to test the hypothesis that the 
HT technology is yield enhancing; (c) determine the probability of a producer 
adopting HT canola, given specific production attributes; and (d) measure the 
benefit to producers from HT production, given the probability of adoption.   
The remainder of this thesis is arranged as follows.  An assessment of canola 
production in Manitoba, Canada is presented in Chapter 2.  Manitoba is chosen for 
analysis in this study because it is agronomically and climatically well-suited for the 
production of canola; it is the third largest canola producing province in Canada.  In 
addition, the provincial crop insurance program was able to provide the data 
essential for the analysis contained in this thesis.   The purpose of Chapter 2 is to 
utilize producer reported data from the province to highlight the incomplete 
adoption of HT canola.  Initial analysis of the producer reported data will provide 
evidence that adopters and non-adopters can be distinguished by certain 
characteristics. 
With the onset of biotechnology, research and development (R&D) of 
agricultural innovations has shifted from the public to the private sector.  This shift 
in the R&D effort has changed how the resulting innovations are supplied to the 
 8
production sector.  The literature on the benefits to producers from the adoption of 
new agricultural innovations will be reviewed in Chapter 3.  This literature can be 
divided into two categories.  The first looks at the returns to innovations that are 
developed through public R&D, while the second approach examines returns to 
innovations that are developed through private R&D and distributed through the 
market and contractual arrangements established by the private sector firms.  The 
literature on the factors that affect adoption will also be examined in Chapter 3 to 
develop a clearer understanding of why producers adopt new technologies.  
A conceptual framework is developed in Chapter 4 that looks at the adoption 
of HT canola specifically as a function of the differing characteristics of producers.  
The model shows that even as technologies become better and cheaper over time, 
there may only be a subset of producers who will benefit from adoption.   
Application of the conceptual model to the canola sector in Manitoba is 
presented in Chapter 5.  The model is tested empirically using a two-stage 
regression model.  In the first stage, individual characteristics such as soil type, year 
and variety grown are regressed on yield.  From this analysis, expected yields of HT 
and non-HT canola are obtained to determine whether HT canola has a yield 
advantage over non-HT canola.  These expected yields are then used to estimate the 
gross returns to different farmers from the adoption of different varieties of canola.  
The second stage of analysis uses the expected yields from the first stage, as well as 
proxy variables for risk, management ability and experience, to determine the 
probability of a producer adopting HT canola.  The second stage of the analysis is 
conducted as a limited dependent variable model, and is estimated using a logit 
regression.   
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of the empirical analysis.  Limitations of the 
study will be discussed, and recommendations for further research will be 
suggested.
2 CANOLA PRODUCTION IN MANITOBA, CANADA 
 
Canola has been deemed Canada’s ‘Cinderella’ crop.  The result of an 
aggressive Canadian rapeseed breeding program in the 1970s, the term ‘canola’ – 
registered as a trademark in 1978 – reflected a differentiated product from 
traditional rapeseed.  The ‘new’ rapeseed, canola, had improved product qualities, 
boasting low erucic acid oil and low glucosinolate meal – attributes that traditional 
rapeseed lacked – which made it ideal for both human food and animal feed 
consumption (Khachatourians et al., 2001).  These attributes increased demand for 
the product on the global market, and Canadian producers responded – partially to 
offset the economic burden from overproduction of cereals – by becoming the 
world’s largest exporter of canola.  
 In 2003, Canada was the third largest producer of canola/rapeseed, with 11 
per cent of the world’s production, next only to China (33 per cent) and the 
European Union (29 per cent) (Agriculture and Agrifood Canada, 2003).  The 
primary growing regions for canola in Canada are the three Prairie Provinces – 
Alberta (including the Peace River region, which partially extends into British 
Columbia), Saskatchewan and Manitoba – with some smaller production in Ontario 
and Quebec. 
To study the adoption of herbicide tolerant canola, this thesis examines grain 
and oilseed producers in the province of Manitoba, Canada.  Manitoba’s climate and 
soil conditions allow producers to have a very diverse portfolio of commodities 
under production.  While wheat and barley still constitute the largest part of grain 
production (43 per cent of the province’s harvested area in 2000), the fertile 
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Figure 2.1 - Canola Production - AB, SK, MB and Total Canada, 1986 - 2003 
 
southern part of the province also allows production of less traditional Canadian 
prairie commodities such as sunflower (approximately 85 per cent of national 
production), buckwheat, grain corn, potatoes and vegetables [Manitoba Agriculture 
and Food (2002)].  
On average, Manitoba produces approximately 20 per cent of the Canadian 
canola crop.  Total canola production in Manitoba has averaged 1.8 million acres 
between 1986 and 2003 – it is the third largest canola producing province, next to 
Saskatchewan (4.5 million acres) and Alberta (3.5 million acres) (Figure 2.1).   
 Manitoba producers began adopting herbicide tolerant canola in 1995, the 
first year the product became commercially available.  Table 2.1 reports acres of 
canola reported to Manitoba crop insurance from 1995 to 2000.  The data reported 
to crop insurance represents an average of 77.5 per cent of the total acres sown to 
canola over this period.  Table 2.1 also reiterates Canada’s canola production, and 
shows that adoption of HT canola in Manitoba very closely mirrors the adoption 
rate at the national level.  It is evident that while a portion of producers have found 
it viable to adopt the technology, not all producers have done so.  This leads to the 
question of what distinguishes adopters from non-adopters of this technology. 
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Table 2.1 - Adoption of HT Canola, Manitoba and Canada 1995-2000. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Manitoba          
Total Canola 
Acres 
1,652 1,158 1,909 2,198 1,916 1,773 1,930 2,150 2,490 
HT Acres 65 193 777 1,301 1,320 1,320 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Per cent HT of 
total 4 17 41 59 69 65 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Canada           
Total Canola 
Acres 
- 8,843 12,040 13,535 13,750 12,192 9,601 7,060 11,587 
HT Acres - 350 4,000 6,000 8,500 7,000 5,857 5,930 n.a. 
Per cent HT of 
total - 4 33 44 62 57 61 84 n.a. 
Source: MCIC database; Author’s Calculations; Fulton and Keyowski (1999); 
Canola Council of Canada (2003); James (2000, 2001, 2002). 
  
 There are many factors that affect the production decisions of producers, 
including soil type, past agronomic management, past weather conditions and 
differing field ‘states’ or conditions, that producers have little choice over.  Other 
production factors such as the type of crop rotation to use, which commodities to 
plant, and where and how to market the product are factors that require producers to 
make a decision.  The choice of adopting new technologies such as herbicide 
tolerance or reduced tillage systems are just two examples of the many decisions 
that producers have to make.  Each producer will make these decisions based on an 
equally diverse set of criteria, such as his individual objectives, management 
abilities or planning horizons.  A common observation is that no two producers will 
make exactly the same decision at the same time regarding any or all of these issues.  
Perhaps a good explanation is the degree of diversity that is inherent in modern day 
agriculture.  There are numerous traits by which one person can be defined as being 
different from another.  Producers can differ from one another according to such 
things as age, level of education, size of farm, the tillage system employed, 
geographic location, skill, management ability and attitude towards risk.  Each of 
these factors plays a role in the decisions made by producers.   
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 The purpose of this chapter is to examine one decision made by farmers – 
the adoption of HT canola – by exploring a sample of Manitoba producers.  
Specifically, the chapter will examine data from the Manitoba Crop Insurance 
database in an effort to assess what distinguishes adopters of the technology from 
non-adopters.   
 One easily determined factor that distinguishes producers is the type of soil 
on which they grow their crops.  There are ten soil types defined by Manitoba Crop 
Insurance Corporation within the province, classified from A – the most productive 
– through J – the least productive.  Productive classification is determined by 
historical yields as well as factors such as climatic and certain soil variables.  Each 
land location in the province is rated according to this classification.  It is important 
to note that while the classes are determined by their productive capability, they are 
not constant throughout the province.  Each classification is specific to the risk area 
– an area that has common production risk with respect to soil and/or climatic 
similarities - it is in.  For example, a C soil in Risk Area 9 may not have the same 
productivity as a C soil in Risk Area 12.   
The difference in average yields between HT and non-HT canola according 
to soil type is shown in Figure 2.2.  Positive values on the graph indicate that the 
average yields for non-HT canola are higher than those for HT.  Several 
observations can be made from the figure.  First, traditional canola has, on average, 
yielded higher than HT canola in all soil zones from 1995 to 1999, with the 
exception of the I soil in 1995.  In 2000, however, HT canola out-yielded non-HT in 
all soil zones except the J soil.  The differences (whether positive or negative) tend 
to be smaller in the central soil types (C  to G) than at either end of the soil 
productivity spectrum.  Non-HT canola seems to have a larger advantage in the less 
productive soils (I and J), and HT canola seems to have a greater advantage in the 
most productive soil (A).  
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Note: Positive values indicate a yield advantage for non-HT canola. 
Figure 2.2 - Average yield difference, Traditional less HT, Manitoba Soil Zones A - J, 1995-
2000. 
 
Producers also differ in their attitude towards risk.  Producers who insure at 
a higher level are assumed to be more risk averse than those who insure at lower 
percentages. Producers who choose to produce HT canola appear to be less risk 
averse than are those who seed traditional canola.  Figure 2.3 depicts the percentage 
difference between the number of producers who seed HT canola less the number 
that seed non-HT canola at each insurance coverage level.  Positive numbers 
indicate a higher percentage of producers that insure HT canola at each coverage 
level than non-HT canola.  From Figure 2.3, producers who insure at the 70 per cent 
level appear more likely to grow HT canola – the one exception to this pattern is 
1997, when a higher percentage of non-HT producers insured at this level.  
Producers who insure at the 80 per cent level are more likely to seed non-HT canola 
(again, with the exception of 1997).  This data is consistent with the view that HT 
canola is a risk management tool; it is also consistent with HT canola growers being 
somewhat less risk averse.     
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Note: Positive values indicate a higher percentage of HT producers at specified coverage 
level. 
Figure 2.3 – Difference in percentage of producers at varying crop insurance coverage levels as 
indication of risk management patterns between HT adopters and non-adopters, Manitoba, 
1995-2000. 
 
 The way producers manage their operations may also have an effect on their 
choice of technology adoption.  One measurement of producers’ management 
ability is the individual productivity index (IPI).  The IPI is a crop-specific ten year 
weighted average of a producer’s yield, measured against the average yield for the 
area.  Therefore, these indices are comparable across all producers as a proxy for 
management.  The canola productivity index (CPI) is the calculated index for an 
individual relative specifically to canola.  Producers of non-HT canola have 
consistently displayed a higher canola productivity index (CPI) in all six years of 
data available for comparison.  The percentage difference of producers seeding 
either type of canola at each index level is shown in Figure 2.4.  Positive values 
indicate the productivity level where there is a higher percentage of HT producers.  
At the lower productivity levels – e.g., at the 50 to 75 per cent and the 76 to 100 per 
cent levels – a greater percentage of producers grow HT canola.  In the higher 
productivity categories – e.g., the 101 to 125 per cent and the 126 to 150 per cent 
levels – a higher percentage of producers grow non-HT canola.   
 Figure 2.5 shows the difference in percentage of HT and non-HT canola 
producers enrolled in crop insurance during different time intervals.  This measure 
can be used as a proxy measure to determine how experience affects the adoption 
decisions of producers.  Positive values on the graph indicate that a higher 
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percentage of producers opted to seed HT canola.  The figure shows the tendency 
for producers in the midrange of farming experience – i.e., those enrolled in crop 
insurance for between 10 and 20 years – to adopt HT canola.  Producers who have 
participated in crop insurance for less than 10 years or more than 30 years were less 
likely to adopt HT canola.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Positive values indicate a higher percentage of HT producers. 
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Figure 2.4 - Percentage difference of producers adopting HT canola at specified CPI levels, HT 
minus non-HT producers, Manitoba, 1995-2000. 
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Note: Positive values indicate a higher percentage of HT producers. 
Figure 2.5 - Percentage difference in number of producers enrolled in crop insurance each 
year, HT producers minus non-HT producers, Manitoba, 1995-2000. 
The price of the technology is another important factor in producers’ 
adoption decisions.  Table 2.2 depicts a cost comparison of the three commercially 
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available HT canola systems, as well as the conventional system using 2003 
suggested retail pricing (SRP). 
From the table, the average costs of HT canola systems are all less than the 
seed and chemical cost for producing conventional canola.  For an individual 
producer, this relationship (i.e., HT systems less expensive that non-HT) may not 
hold true.  Notice from Table 2.2 that the seed costs and chemical costs for each 
system are reported over a range of prices.  While traditional canola has the highest 
average cost of any system, it also has the widest range of costs.  When compared to 
the three HT systems, traditional canola has the lowest cost in the range, 
significantly below that of any of the other three systems.  Traditional canola also 
has a significantly higher cost in its range as compared to the three HT systems. 
The cost of the canola system, itself, is affected by many factors of the 
individual producer.  Seed costs vary with the individual variety chosen.  Canola 
breeders, as with breeders of other crops, continuously try to improve upon crop 
performance.  New varieties are continuously being bred for improved yield, 
increased disease resistance, different climatic regions and other factors.  As new 
and improved varieties come onto the market, older varieties tend to become less 
expensive, if they are still commercially available.  The individual producer chooses 
the variety that will best serve to maximize his or her objective function – whether 
that be to increase yield, decrease chance of disease or extend canola production to 
non-traditional growing regions.  
 The chemical cost component within the price of a canola system will vary 
largely on the amount and type of weed infestation the producer needs to control.  
While there are limited chemical choices for the HT systems, options to control 
weeds in conventional canola are more plentiful.  Higher weed infestations are 
assumed to cost more to control.  Table 2.2 provides one example of a chemical 
combination that could be used.  Again, depending on the weed control required, 
there are both more and less expensive options available to the producer.  
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Table 2.2 - 2003 Canola System Cost Comparison 
 Inputs Clearfield  Roundup Ready Liberty Link Conventional 
Seed:      
Common Varieties 
 
 
 Seed Rate (lbs/ac) 
 Price ($/lb) 
 
 Price per acre  
 
46A76, 45A71, Hylite 289 & 
292 
 
5.5 
3.85 – 4.27 
 
21.17 – 23.49 
 
LG3235, 3455, 3311, Hyola 
505, 512, 45H21 
 
5.96 
2.50 – 6.25 
 
14.90 – 37.25 
 
Invigor brands – 2573, 
2733, 5020, 5030 
 
5.5 
5.80 – 6.25 
 
31.90 – 34.37 
 
Hyola401, Q2, 46A65, Ebony 
 
 
5.75 - 6.2* 
1.00 – 4.50 
 
5.75 – 25.88**
 Chemical: 
 Product(s) 
 
 Application Rate 
  
 
 
 
Price ($/ac)  
 
Absolute or Pursuit Ultra 
 
Abs – 17.3g/ac Odyssey 
          0.17L/ac Lontrel 
PU – 0.07L/ac Pursuit 
               0.19L/ac Poast Ultra 
 
26.07 – 32.99 
 
Glyphosate†
 
0.67 – 1.0 L/ac 
 
 
 
 
7.30 – 9.79 
 
Liberty 
 
0.54 - 1.6L/ac 
 
 
 
 
7.40 – 15.30 
 
Edge & Trifluralin 
 
Edge – 6.9 – 11.3 kg/ac 
Trifluralin – 0.65 – 0.81L/ac 
 
 
 
23.01 – 52.14 
 
Technology Use 
Agreement ($/ac) 
None    
    
$15 None None
Per Acre Cost 47.24 – 56.48 37.20 – 62.04 39.30 – 49.67 28.76 – 78.02 
Average System Cost 
($/ac) 51.86 49.62 44.49 53.39
*Conventional varieties are recommended at 6.2 lbs per acre, with the exception of Hybrids, which are recommended at 5.75 lbs per acre 
**Only Hybrid conventional varieties are priced at $4.50 per lb., thus the maximum cost for seed would be 5.75 lbs. per acre x $4.50 per lb. = $25.88 per acre. 
†With the expiry of the Monsanto’s patent on Roundup, there are many glyphosate products on the market that can be used with the Roundup Ready system. 
Source: Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization (2004); Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Pricing;  
 17
 
 
2.1 Summary 
This chapter has examined the characteristics of canola producers in the 
province of Manitoba for the years 1995 through 2000 to determine the potential 
differences between adopters and non-adopters of GM technology.  Data from 
Manitoba Crop Insurance allows an examination of adoption patterns with respect to 
soil type, management ability, experience and risk. This data suggests that producers 
of HT canola in Manitoba can typically be categorized in the following manner: 
they tend to farm in less productive soils (such as the I or J soil zones); they are less 
productive in canola production, as measured by the canola productivity index; and 
they tend to have a moderate level (10 to 20 years) of farming experience (neither 
the least nor the most experience).   
 The comparisons conducted in this chapter give support to the theory that 
differing characteristics of producers is potentially one explanation for the 
incomplete adoption of HT canola.  The goal in the remaining portion of this thesis 
is to test this theory by developing a conceptual model for adoption that accounts for 
varying characteristics, and then implementing the model in an empirical analysis.  
Prior to consideration of the conceptual component of this thesis in Chapter 4, 
Chapter 3 provides a brief look at previous studies which have estimated producer 
returns from agricultural innovations. 
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3  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Adoption and diffusion of innovations are necessary conditions for 
technological change to occur.  There is often a considerable gap between the time 
when an innovation is made available, and the time that it becomes widely used.  
Rogers’ (1962) work was some of the first to suggest that diffusion of innovations is 
an S-shaped curve which is a function of time.  The S-shape illustrates a function 
which depicts a process where the rate of adoption essentially moves from ‘zero’ – 
prior to initial adoption – to ‘zero’ – where adoption of the innovation ceases.  The 
initial period depicts adoption at a relatively low rate; this initial period is followed 
by a take-off period where the potential market is penetrated to a large extent in a 
relatively short period of time.  A period of saturation follows the take-off, where 
diffusion rates of the innovation slow.  At the point when diffusion peaks, adoption 
rates approach zero.  Often, there is also a period of decline, when one observes 
obsolescence of the technology as it is potentially replaced by another innovation or 
the number of potential adopters is exhausted. 
Factors that influence individuals’ decisions to adopt new innovations have 
been the focus of many studies attempting to explain the adoption behavior.  
Mansfield (1961) and others suggested that adoption and diffusion occurred as a 
result of imitation, where contact with others spurs the spread of the technology.  A 
key assumption in imitation models of adoption is that producers are homogeneous.  
David (1975) and others relaxed the assumption of homogeneous producers in the 
threshold model of adoption.  The threshold model contributes an important aspect 
to adoption modeling not captured in the imitation model – the assumption that 
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producers are heterogeneous in their production practices, and will adopt 
technologies as a function of their individual characteristics.  Once an innovation 
has been adopted the returns from its generation and introduction – at all levels, 
from innovator to producer – can be estimated.  A significant number of studies 
have estimated the returns to new agricultural cropping technologies (Griliches, 
1958; Nagy and Furtan, 1978; for an overview, see Alston, Norton and Pardey, 
1995).  Traditional analyses of new agricultural innovations were relatively 
straightforward.  The public nature of R&D facilitated empirical estimation of 
benefits and returns because of the transparency of information.  This transparency 
allowed economists to estimate the effects of a new technology throughout the 
supply chain, from innovator to producer.   
One characteristic of public innovations is that they are typically priced 
competitively (i.e., at marginal cost of production of innovation).  Innovations 
resulting from publicly funded research and supplied competitively to downstream 
competitive producers are often drastic innovations, or innovations that are priced 
below the old technology and completely take over the market.    Welfare measures 
for competitively supplied innovations and the returns to agricultural R&D are 
relatively straightforward.   
With an increasing amount of private investment in the agricultural input 
industry, primarily with respect to agrochemical and seed development, traditional 
welfare and returns-to-research analyses have become much more complex.  One 
reason is that information has become less transparent given the private nature of 
the R&D.  A second reason for this complexity is the introduction of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection.  One characteristic of IPRs, such as patents, is that 
those firms who hold them can exert (limited) monopoly power over the price of the 
innovation the IPR is protecting.  If the IPR-protected innovation is supplied to a 
previously competitive market, innovations are more likely to be non-drastic, even 
if they are supply-inducing (Moschini and Lapan, 1997).   
A non-drastic innovation occurs when both technologies co-exist in the 
market.  While the monopolistic innovator can set price to effectively capture the 
benefit producers would see from a supply increase in their production, setting the 
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price any higher than the pre-existing, competitively supplied technology would 
deter producers from adopting the new innovation.  Producers are effectively faced 
with (relatively) the same price for both technologies, and both will exist in the 
market. 
 Literature surrounding adoption theory, including a brief discussion of 
adoption modeling, will be discussed in Section 3.1.  Studies which consider 
traditional methods of estimating returns to producers, specifically from canola 
production, are examined in Section 3.2.  Recognizing that the benefits from 
adopting herbicide tolerant technology cannot be estimated in the same way because 
of the private nature of its development, studies that have considered the returns to 
adopting privately funded agricultural innovations will be reviewed in Section 3.3.  
 
3.1 Adoption and Diffusion of New Innovations 
 There has been considerable study done on the processes of adoption and 
diffusion of new innovations in the economic literature.  Numerable works have 
attempted to chronicle the proposed theories regarding the process of adoption, 
including: Rogers (1962, 1983); Davies (1979); Mahajan and Peterson (1985) and 
Stoneman (2002).  Many of these reference the pioneering works of Griliches 
(1957) and Rogers (1962), each of whom proposed a model depicting diffusion of 
innovations through a system as a function of time.   
Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of the process of diffusion as proposed by 
Griliches (1957) and Rogers (1962), which is still widely accepted today.  The key 
feature of the illustration in Figure 3.1 is the S-shape of the curve.  This curve shows 
that when an innovation is first introduced, adoption occurs very slowly; both the 
number of adopters and the rate of adoption are low.  Adoption increases quickly, or 
“takes off” when approximately 10 to 25 per cent of the population has adopted the 
innovation.  This rapid increase generally continues until approximately half of the 
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Figure 3.1 - Diffusion of Innovations 
Source: Rogers (1962)  
 
population has adopted, at which time the rate of adoption slows down as fewer and 
fewer individuals adopt (Rogers, 1962).  
While the process of adoption as a function of time is generally widely 
accepted, there are many theories as to what causes adoption to occur.  Heiman et 
al. (2000) cite imitation – the process by which an individual learns by word of 
mouth or by observing another individual’s behavior – as one of the reasons.  
Mansfield (1961) developed a mathematical model which depicts adoption as a 
result of imitation.  In this model, if Xt represents the portion of producers who have 
adopted the innovation by time t, then the change in aggregate adoption in period t 
can be written as  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=∂
∂
k
XbX
t
X t
t
t 1 , 
 where b is the acceleration factor and k is the maximum level of diffusion.  This 
equation, referred to as the motion of diffusion by Heiman et al. (2000), depicts the 
dynamic nature of diffusion.  It shows how marginal diffusion in time t is 
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proportionate to both realized diffusion and unutilized potential for diffusion.  The 
solution to this differential equation results in an S-shaped diffusion curve, as 
represented by . ( )[ ] 11 −+−+= tt ekX βα
Ghadim and Pannell (1999) concur with the imitation aspect of adoption and 
state that the smaller the distance from and the greater the frequency of contact with 
adopters by non-adopters will further stimulate adoption.  Beyond contact with 
adopters, learning by doing and the impact of the learning on producers’ personal 
perceptions of a technology further encourage diffusion of the innovation. 
While the imitation model accounts for differing rates of diffusion, it does 
not explicitly explain what motivates producers to adopt a new technology at 
different times.  One critical assumption in the imitation model is that producers, or 
firms, are homogeneous.  Mansfield (1963) relaxed the assumption that producers 
are uniform and utilized characteristics of the firm such as size, growth rate, 
liquidity, expected profitability from the innovation, attributes of management 
personnel (such as age) and past profits to predict the timing of introducing a new 
innovation.  Kislev and Shchori-Bachrach (1973) also assumed producers were 
differentiated, and proposed a theory in which the timing of technological change is 
a function of the skill set in a market.  According to Kislev and Shchori-Bachrach’s 
model, early adopters are highly skilled and entrepreneurial. As the technology 
diffuses, it does so down the ‘skill scale’, implying that late adopters are lesser 
skilled. 
Threshold models, first introduced by David (1975), and revisited by 
Heiman et al. (2000), also account for heterogeneity among individuals.  Threshold 
models note that if producers are varied across some production attribute such as 
farm size, management capability, or agronomic factors, for example, then at any 
moment there is a threshold that will differentiate between adopters and non-
adopters of the innovation.  The threshold level changes as economic conditions – 
such as an increase in profits – change.     
Graphically, the idea of threshold levels can be shown in Figure 3.2.  In the 
figure, curve  represents the benefit that different producers receive from the 
introduction of a new technology.  Producers are differentiated according to the 
NT
tB
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attribute A, which is graphed on the horizontal axis.  The attribute A could represent 
features such as soil type or risk attitude – each point on the horizontal axis thus 
represents a different producer.  The mass of producers has been set equal to one so 
that the proportion of the population can easily be identified.   
The downward slope of   indicates that the benefit derived from the 
technology decreases as the level of the differentiating attribute is increased.  The 
downward slope on  thus captures the idea that the benefits of the new 
technology differ across individuals.  Let B
NT
tB
NT
tB
E  be the benefit producers receive from 
the existing technology in time period t.  This benefit is assumed to be constant 
across all producers. 2  Under these conditions, a threshold point exists at point At . 
Producers located to the left of At benefit from the adoption of the new technology, 
since >NTtB
EB .  To the right of the threshold At are producers who remain better off 
by not adopting.   
Extending the analysis to the next time period illustrates how a reduction in 
the threshold level can induce further adoption and diffusion of the innovation.  
Over time, technologies often become better and cheaper as the firms developing 
them achieve economies of scale.  A reduction in the cost of obtaining the 
technology over time is captured by a shift from  to , resulting in the 
percentage of producers adopting the technology rising to A
NT
tB
NT
tB '
t’.   
Changing producer perception of technologies may also reduce the threshold 
level and lead to further adoption.  However, there needs to be some mechanism 
which triggers the change in perception.  For the results of the threshold model to 
apply, Heiman et al. express the caveat that adoption will only occur if producers 
assess a new technology at the time when the economic conditions for them to adopt 
are right.  In practice, producers do not constantly assess new technology, and are 
often not informed that new technologies exist.   
 
 
                                                 
2 The assumption of identical benefits to all producers is made to facilitate the graphical exposition 
and can easily be modified. 
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Figure 3.2 - Change in Threshold Adoption Level 
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For adoption to be consistent with the threshold model (i.e. at any given 
moment there is a threshold level that distinguishes adopters from non-adopters, as 
given by the x-axis in Figure 3.2), there must be some continuous means to 
stimulate producers to adopt the technology at any given time.  This is where the 
theories of imitation and threshold modeling interact.  A wide body of the adoption 
literature has suggested that imitation and extension activities contribute to 
producers’ knowledge of new technology.  Extension activities generally focus on 
early adopters, and therefore trigger adoption of a technology.  Once employed by 
early adopters, other producers observe use of the technology by someone with 
similar characteristics to their own – for example, someone with similar soil type or 
employing the same type of tillage system – and those producers are then more 
likely to invest in the technology themselves.  In this way, imitation acts motivates 
diffusion dynamic, and is still consistent with threshold theory. 
A key to the above explanation is that the diffusion dynamic arises because 
of the differentiated characteristics of producers.  Differences in timing of adoption 
by producers occur because there is at least some dissimilarity in characteristics 
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from one producer to the next at any point in time.  Given this explanation, the S-
shape of the diffusion curve in Figure 3.1 will arise when the benefit producers 
realize changes at a constant rate over time (Heiman et al., 2000). 
 
3.2 Producer Benefits from Canola Production 
 Production of canola in Canada dates back to the Second World War and the 
use of rapeseed oil as a machine lubricant.  Producer interest in the production of 
this commodity increased with the subsequent development of crushing and 
extraction facilities in the 1950s and 1960s.  Rapeseed proved to be a viable 
alternative to cereal crops and allowed producers some diversity in their crop 
rotation.  Increased interest in the crop spurred a large breeding effort to enhance the 
qualities of the plant for human consumption – until 1960 its uses were mostly 
limited to industrial applications.  With the late 1960s advent of rapeseed varieties 
with decreased levels of erucic acid and glucosinolates – the components harmful to 
humans and animals – the industry adopted the term ‘canola’ in the late 1970s to 
enhance the image of this new commodity to the consumer (Phillips et al., 2001).   
 The breeding effort that has been expended on canola is quite impressive 
(see Khachatourians et al. (2001) for a more detailed examination).  The pioneering 
study which examined the returns to the breeding program was conducted by Nagy 
and Furtan in 1978.  Using a Marshallian producer and consumer surplus approach 
to measure the social gains made from the development of rapeseed varieties, the 
authors found there to be a 101 per cent return on investment.  From their 
estimation, 53 per cent of this gain accrued to consumers, with producers receiving 
the remaining 47 per cent.   
 Ulrich et al. (1984) re-estimated the Nagy and Furtan study over a longer 
period (from 1951-1982); this study was followed by a study by Ulrich and Furtan 
(1985) for the period 1951-1983.  These studies found there to be a fifty and fifty-
one percent internal rate of return, with producers laying claim to sixty-eight and 
sixty-five per cent of the gains, respectively.  Over the approximately 30 year period 
analyzed in both studies, canola production had not yet proliferated to other 
countries, but was an export commodity for Canada.  One difference in the results of 
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the Ulrich et al. and Ulrich and Furtan studies is due to the consideration of foreign 
consumers in the 1985 study, who were estimated to receive four per cent of the 
benefits.  
 Over the next decade, canola became one of the world’s premium oils, and a 
significant export commodity for Canada.  Gray and Malla (2000) considered the 
distribution of returns to the investment made by the Rapeseed Association of 
Canada specifically to improve the quality of canola, under the assumption that 
yield (and thus supply) would be compromised.  The study found that the increased 
perception of canola as a healthy alternative to substitutes such as palm oil increased 
the demand for canola.  However, the reduction in yield from earlier varieties of 
rapeseed was found to increase the per-unit cost of production for canola.  
Analyzing these effects over the 1960 to 1992 period in a three-region world model 
led the authors to the conclusion that the increase in demand outweighed the 
increase in cost of production.  The effort to increase quality led to an overall 
economic gain, with producers benefiting in all three regions (Gray and Malla, 
2000).  
Until the mid 1980s, canola research was largely publicly funded.  In the late 
1980s and the early 1990s, canola research was driven more by private investment 
and increased interaction between the seed and chemical markets (Phillips et al., 
2001).  These factors culminated in the commercial release of the first transgenic 
canola varieties in 1995.  The primary trait expressed by those first varieties of 
transgenic canola was herbicide tolerance.  Since then, many other varieties of 
herbicide tolerant canola have been made commercially available – many as a result 
of privately funded research.  As Section 3.3 shows, privately funded R&D in the 
presence of intellectual property rights (IPRs) significantly changes how the benefits 
from an innovation accrue to producers.  While there has not been any significant 
work on the benefits to producers from using HT canola, there have been numerous 
studies estimating the impacts from the adoption of other agricultural innovations 
resulting from private R&D. 
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3.3 Impacts from Adoption of Privately Funded Agricultural Innovations 
The introduction of intellectual property rights (IPRs) as an impetus for 
private research and development significantly changed how the distribution of 
benefits from adoption of an agricultural commodity should be analyzed.  The 
presence of IPRs allows private companies undertaking R&D and subsequently 
distributing the innovations to exert market power in the industry.  Fulton (1997) 
and Moschini and Lapan (1997) discuss the implications of IPRs on the distribution 
of returns to innovation.  One important observation is that, due to the nature of the 
goods produced, IPRs have the ability to create oligopolistic industries.   
Moschini and Lapan (1997) show how imperfect competition in the input 
supply sector changes the analysis of benefits from the case where technologies are 
supplied competitively.  Figure 3.3 shows the pre-innovation supply curve, or 
marginal cost of production, given by So, which is a function of the competitive 
price of the input wo and output price p.  Producers realize a pre-innovation benefit 
equal to area B in Figure 3.3.  With the introduction of a more efficient technology, 
the post innovation supply curve shifts out to .  This new curve is a function of 
output price p and w
'
1S
1, the competitive price of the more efficient input.  Under 
traditional analysis, the benefits to the resulting innovation would then be measured 
directly from this new curve, and is equal to area (C+D) in Figure 3.3.   
Moschini and Lapan argue that due to the presence of IPRs, innovating firms 
are able to exert market power over the price of the innovation.  The ability to exert 
market power enables the innovating firm to set price so that some or all of the 
benefit producers obtain from the new technology is captured.  There are two 
possibilities for the innovating firm with market power.  The innovating firm may 
find it optimal to set the price of the new technology (adjusted for the increase in 
productivity) equal to the price of the old technology.  Since the prices of the new 
and old technologies are equal, only some of the market will be captured, and the 
technology is non-drastic.  Producers will receive no benefit from adopting the new 
technology.  Alternatively, the innovating firm may find it optimal to set the price of 
the new technology below the price of the old technology.  In this case, the 
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innovator will be able to capture the entire market, and the technology is drastic.  
Producers will receive the benefit of the lower cost of the input.   
If the profit maximizing price of the new technology is found to be higher 
than that of the old technology, then this constraint becomes binding – at any price 
higher than that of the old technology, the new technology will not be adopted.  
Producers would see no difference in price between the two technologies (i.e., 
w1=wo) and S1 would directly coincide with So.  The result is that adoption of the 
new innovation will not be complete, and the old and new technologies will co-exist 
– i.e., the technology is non-drastic.  Although the increased efficiency of the 
technology would normally have shifted supply curve outward to S1’, the increase in 
the price of the innovated input (w1), supplied non-competitively, shifts the curve 
back inward.  The resulting supply curve, S1, now approximates the old supply 
curve, S0.   
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Figure 3.3 - Effect of non-competitive input pricing 
 
The scenario presented in Figure 3.3 allows both the old and new 
technologies to coexist in the market. The innovation is thus termed ‘non-drastic’.  
The innovation would be deemed ‘drastic’ if the price of the new technology was set 
sufficiently below the price of the old technology so that it completely takes over 
the market.  In this case, the relevant supply curve would be , as producers would 
effectively see a decrease in their cost of production due to a lower input price, w
'
1S
1.  
All producers would find it more profitable to use the new technology and the 
technology would be completely adopted.  Fulton and Giannakas (2002) show, in 
detail, the conditions under which drastic or non-drastic innovation will emerge.  
Several studies have considered the returns to non-competitively supplied 
innovations under the assumption of monopolistic (or oligopolistic) power in the 
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input market.3  Moschini et al. (2000) extend the analysis of Moschini and Lapan to 
assess the impact of adopting Roundup Ready© soybeans in an open economy 
setting.  The results of this study show that producers in the home country (i.e., the 
country developing the technology) lose surplus due to spillover effects when the 
technology is adopted in competing countries.  However, the magnitude of the loss 
is diminished if producers in foreign countries are subjected to strong IPRs (i.e., 
foreign producers are required to pay the same markup – such as a technology fee – 
as are domestic producers).   
Falck-Zepeda et al. (2000a) consider the adoption of Bt cotton in the United 
States in 1996.  Using the economic surplus model developed by Moschini and 
Lapan (1997) and extended to an open economy, the study used cost of production 
data to estimate the distribution of surplus between consumers, producers and 
innovators.  The study found that the innovation resulted in a first-year increase in 
world surplus of US$240.3 million.  Of this surplus, US cotton producers received 
59 per cent of the increase.   
The returns in the second year of Bt cotton planting, as well as preliminary 
estimates of the returns to HT soybeans in the US are examined in Falck-Zepeda et 
al. (2000b).  Using the same methodology as in Falck-Zepeda et al. (2000a), returns 
to Bt cotton adoption were re-estimated at US$164.9 million in 1997, with only 42 
per cent of this increase accruing to domestic US producers.  In the case of HT 
soybeans, it was estimated that US producers received between 29 per cent and 76 
per cent of the surplus generated by adoption, depending on the estimates of supply 
elasticity that were used.   
 
                                                 
3Several studies have addressed the issue of returns to innovations in imperfectly 
competitive markets when the output market downstream of the innovating production sector is able 
to exert market power.  Huang and Sexton’s (1996) assessment of producers adopting mechanical 
tomato harvesters in Taiwan in the presence of oligopsonistic procurement is one example.  Alston et 
al. (1997) examined the size and distribution of research benefits when processors are able to exert 
both oligopsonistic power in purchasing raw commodity from the producer and oligopolistic power 
in selling processed farm products.  
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3.4 Summary 
 There is a large body of literature relative to the adoption of new 
technologies.  Early examinations of adoption focused on imitation by others who 
have already adopted the technology.  Subsequent studies suggested threshold 
theory was a more robust means of modeling innovation adoption and diffusion, as 
it recognized that all producers differ in their production characteristics.  Producers 
can differ in terms of such things as farm size, agronomic practices employed, 
geography, age, education and management ability.  Threshold theory maintains that 
at any point in time, over a set of producer characteristics, there is a threshold level 
which distinguishes adopters from non-adopters of the technology.  There has been 
some suggestion that imitation may be the impetus for technologies to diffuse 
beyond early adopters, as others’ perception of the technology changes with 
observation.  Learning by doing has also been cited as a method that facilitates 
diffusion of an innovation.  
Once an agricultural innovation has been adopted, the impacts of its 
adoption can be estimated.  The evolution of canola from a non-edible industrial 
commodity (rapeseed) to a product known for its premium oil qualities for human 
consumption and further as one of the first widely distributed and commercially 
produced products of biotechnology is an excellent example of innovation.  This 
chapter has reviewed some of the economic assessments of canola as it evolved 
under both a publicly and privately motivated research agenda.   
 Under publicly conducted R&D, estimates of the returns to rapeseed (and 
then canola) research over an approximate 30 year span – from the 1950s to the 
1980s – range from approximately 50 per cent to 101 per cent.  Producers have 
received between 47 and 67 per cent of these gains, with consumers laying claim to 
the rest.   
With increasing involvement of private money into research the distribution 
of the gains becomes different.  New technologies have been seen to decrease cost 
of production to producers, but theory suggests the production sector might not see 
the same returns to research as it did during times of public research.  The presence 
of IPRs has allowed private innovating companies to price their innovations (seed 
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and chemical) non-competitively, and thus to capture the benefits of a lower cost of 
production at the farm level.  Despite this prediction, empirical estimates of the 
returns to biotechnological innovations – in particular to HT soybeans and Bt cotton 
– suggest that producers receive between 30 and 70 percent of the returns to 
research.  
 The literature reviewed in this chapter has suggested that there are some 
benefits to producers from using cost-reducing technologies that have resulted from 
privately funded research.  To date, there have been no empirical estimates 
specifically on the returns to producers from adopting HT canola, a product of 
privately funded research.  Chapter 4 will consider a conceptual model that will 
attempt to identify adopters of HT technology in canola from non-adopters.  Chapter 
5 will empirically test the model developed in Chapter 4, and extend the results to 
an analysis of the gross returns to producers from adoption of HT canola.  
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4 ESTIMATING PRODUCER BENEFITS  
 
While HT technology has been widely accepted, it has not been completely 
adopted by Canadian canola producers (see Chapter 1) or Manitoba canola 
producers (see Chapter 2).  The fact that this technology has not been fully adopted 
suggests that it is a non-drastic innovation.  As indicated in Chapter 3, the benefits 
that accrue to producers under a non-drastic innovation are quantitatively different 
than those under a drastic innovation.  Chapter 2 points out that producers may 
differ in a number of characteristics (e.g. soil zone, management ability, risk 
aversion) and that these differences appear to be correlated with the adoption of HT 
technology.  Thus, it is critical to consider producer heterogeneity when examining 
the adoption of HT technology.  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a conceptual model which 
specifically considers adoption of a new technology as a function of the 
characteristics of the adopters.  Section 4.1 develops a (mathematical) conceptual 
model based on threshold theory to explain the adoption decision of producers over 
time.  Section 4.2 builds upon the threshold model and develops a model that 
considers an estimation of the returns to producers from the adoption of HT canola.   
 
4.1 Threshold Model of Adoption of HT canola 
Several studies have considered varying characteristics among producers as 
factors in adoption of innovations similar to HT canola.  Tauer (2001) estimates the 
impact on profits of dairy producers adopting or not adopting recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (rBST).  A dummy variable regression is used to estimate profits as a 
function of technology use and farmer characteristics.  Tauer acknowledges the 
potential for self-selection bias to exist in his model, as producers who adopt rbST 
may generally be more or less profitable, even without the technology.  To correct 
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for this bias, Tauer employs a binary probit analysis to determine adoption of rbST 
as a function of producer characteristics.  The probit analysis regresses age, 
education, business organization and farm size on the decision of producers to adopt 
or not adopt rbST technology.  Modified results of the probit analysis are then 
included in the dummy variable regression to account for selection bias.   
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2001) examine factors affecting the adoption of 
two technological innovations, genetically engineered crops (specifically corn and 
soybeans) and precision agriculture systems.  The authors employ a censored choice 
tobit model to distinguish between the adoption decision and the intensity, or extent, 
of adoption by controlling for one characteristic – farm size.  One model is 
estimated for each technology – HT soybeans, HT corn, Bt corn, and precision 
agriculture.  In each model, the authors regressed the extent of adoption against 
proxy variables for those factors assumed to influence the adoption decision. 
For the models concerning genetically engineered crops, Fernandez-Cornejo 
et al. define the extent of adoption as, “…the proportion of total harvested corn 
(soybean) acres in herbicide-tolerant corn (soybeans), as well as the proportion of 
total corn acres in Bt corn.”  In the model estimating precision agriculture adoption, 
the extent of adoption is defined as, “…the proportion of total crop acres on which 
the variable rate technology (VRT) was applied for seeding, fertilizing or applying 
chemicals.”  The factors influencing adoption in all models include farm size, 
producer risk attitudes, level of education, experience, off-farm employment, land 
tenure, credit reserves, farm typology, use of contracting, degree of pest infestation, 
and region.  The authors present their results as decomposed elasticities to show 
how responsive current users, non-users and the sum of both are to changes in farm 
size. 
Payne et al. (2003) assessed the likelihood of corn producers adopting the 
corn rootworm (CRW) Bt technology by considering the influence operator and 
farm socioeconomic characteristics would have on expected adoption.  The paper 
employed an ordered logit model, and considered factors such as operator age and 
education, farm size, specialization in corn production, crop rotation, current 
technology use, current CRW infestation, geographic location, off-farm labor and 
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current CRW management practices to estimate the probability of adoption.  Factors 
that were found to positively influence the likelihood of adoption included age of 
operator, farm size, significant current infestations (or expected infestations) of 
CRW, experience with corn borer Bt technology and specialization in corn 
production (i.e., derived greater than 50 per cent of the operation’s value of 
production from corn).  Off-farm income had a negative affect on expected 
adoption, as did the location of farms in the eastern Corn Belt of the United States.   
Barham et al. (2004) examined the dynamic adoption of recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (rBST) technology in Wisconsin and identified producer 
characteristics that would distinguish between early and late adoption, as well as 
non-adoption and dis-adoption (defined as discontinued use of the technology).  The 
study found that non-adopters were distinct in terms of their characteristics, having 
smaller operations, lower use of complementary technologies and possessing 
relatively negative views toward technology, as compared to adopters or dis-
adopters.  The only distinguishing characteristics revealed in the analysis relative to 
early and late adopters and dis-adopters were attitude toward the technology and use 
of complementary technologies.  The study did not find overwhelming evidence that 
there would be further significant adoption of the rBST technology in Wisconsin, 
which plateaued in 2001-02. 
Burton et al. (2003) employ Duration Analysis to consider the effect of both 
economic and non-economic characteristics of producers on the adoption of organic 
horticultural technology in the United Kingdom.  Duration Analysis allows both 
adoption and diffusion of an innovation to be analyzed simultaneously by 
considering the timing of adoption in a dynamic context.  While the study found that 
gender and attitudes toward environmentalism and sustainability were influential 
factors in the decision to adopt, duration analysis found that for some conventional 
producers, the probability of adoption ‘degenerated’ rapidly.  That is, the predicted 
time for adoption to occur for an individual producer exceeded the expected time 
over which that producer was still likely to be farming. 
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4.2 Modeling Producer Adoption of HT Canola 
For the purposes of this thesis, which specifically considers the 
characteristics of producers which would lead to adoption or non-adoption of HT 
canola, the threshold model will be employed.  Recall the threshold model 
developed graphically in Figure 3.2 which suggests that a producer will adopt the 
technology when the economic benefit to do so is right, depending upon the 
individual’s characteristics.  Mathematically, the threshold model can also be 
described in terms of the probability of producers adopting the new technology.  
Producers will benefit from the adoption of HT technology when  , 
where  explicitly denotes that the benefits of the new technology are a 
function of the producer attribute A.  The term 
( ) ENTt BAB >
( )AB NTt
EB  denotes the benefits of the 
existing technology.  Suppose that the benefits of the new technology are uncertain, 
i.e. ε+= NTtNTt BB  where NTtB is the expected benefit, and ε is an error term with 
mean zero.  The probability of an individual with attribute A adopting the 
technology is given by 
     ( )[ ] ENTt BABP >+ ε .                                    (4.1) 
Rearranging 4.1 indicates that the probability of an individual with attribute A 
adopting is  
    ( ) ( )ABBP NTtE −>ε ,                                             (4.2) 
i.e., the probability of adopting is given by the probability of the error being greater 
than the difference between the benefit from the existing technology and the 
expected benefit from the new technology.  
 The model presented above carries the implicit feature that the variable of 
interest – adoption of a technology – can take either a yes ( 1=Y ) or no ( ) 
response; that is, the dependent variable is dichotomous.  Models of this nature are 
referred to as discrete choice models.  Following Greene (2000), the decision to 
adopt ( ) or not adopt (
0=Y
1=Y 0=Y ) can be depicted as 
( ) ( )
( ) ( β
β
,10Pr
,1Pr
AFY
AFY
−== )
==
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where A is the vector of differentiating factors such as risk attitude, management 
and experience that explain the adoption decision; is a set of parameters 
accounting for the changes in A on the probability of the decision; and F represents 
a continuous probability distribution.   
β
 
The probability decision can, thus, be modeled as a regression: 
[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]Aβ'Aβ'A FFyE 110 +−=  
       ( )Aβ'F= .      (4.3) 
While this model can be estimated using any continuous probability distribution, it 
is important that the underlying theory being tested is supported by the resulting 
predictions.  Common distributions used in discrete choice analysis include the 
normal distribution, which gives rise to the probit model, and the logistic 
distribution, resulting in the logit model.   
 
4.3 Estimating Producer Returns from the Adoption of an Innovation 
 
The threshold model provides key insights into the adoption patterns of 
producers.  The idea that there is a point of differentiation among producers at 
which they will either adopt or not adopt a new technology can be extended to an 
analysis of the benefits producers receive from the adoption of an innovation.  
Fulton and Keyowski (1999) develop a model which accounts for producer 
heterogeneity and differing adoption patterns to assess the benefit to producers from 
adopting a new technology – herbicide tolerant canola.  The model will be discussed 
in detail, as it will provide the basis for the empirical analysis in this thesis.  
If producers are assumed to be differentiated according to some 
characteristic, or combination of characteristics, then they can be expected to 
receive net returns from their production as depicted in Figure 4.1.  Suppose 
producers are differentiated with respect to an attribute such as the type of tillage 
system they employ.  Producers are distributed along the horizontal axis from left to 
right according to the degree of reduced tillage that they use.  For instance, those 
producers who use a conventional method of tillage and do not employ any type of 
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conservation tillage practices can be located to the left of the diagram.  At the right 
side of the diagram are located those producers who have adopted reduced tillage 
practices.  Those at the extreme right use zero-tillage technology.  
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Figure 4.1 - Net Returns from an Existing Technology 
 
The assumption is made that those producers who have adopted reduced or 
minimum tillage practices will receive a higher net return from the production of 
their commodity – in this case canola – than will those who have not adopted such 
methods.  For the purposes of this model, net returns prior to adoption of HT canola, 
the innovation, are given by the equation ( )App stc φ−− , where  is the price of 
canola,  is the price of the seed and chemical package, A is the differentiation 
attribute and 
cp
s
tp
φ  is a cost reduction parameter.  The producer who uses conventional 
tillage – i.e., the producer with A =0 – realizes a net return of .  Returns for 
the producer who has adopted a zero tillage method – i.e., the producer with A=1 – 
is given by .  Note that the less the tillage system disturbs the soil, the 
higher are the returns.  Total returns to the production of traditional canola are 
represented by the shaded area of Figure 4.1.  Note that because returns are higher 
for those producers who use reduced tillage practices, producers have the incentive 
to invest capital into these types of systems.   
s
t
c pp −
φ−− stc pp
 The introduction of an innovation, in this instance HT canola, is shown in 
Figure 4.2.  As in the case of traditional canola, the assumption is made that those 
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producers who adopt HT canola and employ reduced tillage practices will receive 
higher returns than those producers who adopt the HT technology but retain 
conventional tillage practices.  Net returns from the adoption of HT canola are given 
by the equation , where  is the price of canola,  is the price of the 
seed and chemical package, A is the differentiation attribute and 
App sht
c γ−− cp shtp
γ  is a cost 
reduction parameter.  The producer who uses conventional tillage – i.e., the 
producer with A =0 – realizes a net return of .  Returns for the producer 
who has adopted a zero tillage method – i.e., the producer with A=1 – is given by 
.  Total returns to the production of HT canola are represented by the 
total shaded area of Figure 4.2, less area B.     
s
ht
c pp −
γ−− shtc pp
From Figure 4.2, it is obvious that producers who use conventional tillage 
are better off using the old technology.  Producers who have adopted a reduced 
tillage system corresponding with A* are indifferent between the old and new 
technologies.  Producers who employ a tillage system to the right of A* benefit 
more from the use of HT canola, with those located on the extreme right receiving 
the most benefit.  An important aspect of this framework is that although not all 
producers adopt HT canola, there are benefits to be had by those who do adopt.  
Since adopters receive an additional benefit over that obtained from the production 
of the old technology, overall benefit to the market is increased. 
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tive statics can easily be carried out using the above model.  A 
price of traditional seed will, ceteris paribus, increase the benefit of 
nal technology – an effect that can easily be seen by shifting the 
urve upward.  The upward shift of this curve also exemplifies the 
e of traditional seed on the production of HT canola.  Specifically, 
will adopt the technology, and fewer benefits will be had from its 
 in the price of the new technology will also, ceteris paribus, affect 
ucers realize from its adoption.  Notice that as the price of HT 
ases, the benefits to producers decrease (this can be shown as a 
of the ( )App shtc γ−−  curve).  If the price of HT seed is sufficiently 
e no benefit from the use of the innovation and no producers will 
tuation would occur if the net returns line for new technology lies 
w that of the old technology.  Therefore, pricing of the technology 
ct to consider.  
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 The framework developed above can easily be incorporated into the 
adoption probability model outlined in section 4.1.  Assuming the benefits of the 
new technology are uncertain, the benefits can be written as 
   ( ) εγπ +−−= App shtc     (4.4) 
Substituting equation 4.4 depicting the benefits from production of traditional and 
HT canola into equation 4.1 results in 
( )[ ] ( )AppAppP stcshtc φεγ +−>+−− .  (4.5) 
By rearranging equation 4.5, the probability of HT canola being adopted is given by   
( ) ( ) ( )AppAppP shtcstc γφε −−−+−>   
( ) ( ) ( )AppP stsht φγε −+−>⇒ .   (4.6)  
The term  in Equation 4.6 captures the benefits producers realize 
from the new technology.  Generally, the probability of adopting is affected by the 
cost of the technology and the yield a producer expects to achieve from adopting the 
technology.   
s
t
s
ht pp −
 The term ( )Aφγ −  captures the cost reduction an individual can realize from 
using the new technology, based on his individual characteristics such as 
management ability, risk aversion and experience.  The benefit producers see from 
using the technology will be influenced directly by the set of characteristics they 
possess.  
 
4.4 Summary 
 This chapter develops a conceptual framework which determines the 
probability of adopting an innovation based on producers having different 
characteristics.  From this theory a model is developed which specifically concerns 
the adoption of HT canola.  The analysis shows that while some producers benefit 
from the adoption of HT canola, others remain better off by retaining the old 
technology – conventional canola.  Comparative statics show that producers are less 
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likely to adopt HT canola (and thus less likely to benefit from its use) when the 
price of traditional seed is low, or when the price of HT seed is sufficiently high.   
The results of this chapter form the basis for the analysis in Chapter 5.  The 
analysis in Chapter 5 is twofold.  An estimation of expected yields as a function of 
soil type, growing conditions and variety of canola is conducted in stage one of the 
analysis.  The assumption is that expected yield is one factor that will determine a 
producer’s probability of adopting HT canola.  The estimation of expected yields 
will then be employed in a logit model, along with other factors such as producer 
experience, risk aversion and productivity rating to estimate the probability of 
adoption.     
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5 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
The previous chapter outlined a conceptual model concerning the adoption of 
HT canola when producers are assumed to be heterogeneous.  There are many 
characteristics which differentiate producers.  Differentiating factors which 
influence the decision to adopt a technology include experience, attitudes toward 
risk and the producer’s expectation on the performance of the technology, among 
others.  In the context of this thesis, the effective influence of these factors in 
combination culminates in the producer’s decision to either adopt or not adopt HT 
canola technology.  An empirical estimation concerning the impact of the factors 
influencing adoption thus needs to take place in the context of a limited dependent 
variable (LDV) model.  The logit model is one type of LDV that can be used to 
estimate the effect of differentiating factors on the probability of a producer 
adopting HT canola.   
Data provided by Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation (MCIC) is used in the 
empirical estimation, and is collected at the individual producer level.  This data 
includes the choice of technology a producer has made (i.e., HT or non-HT canola), 
individual risk profiles, experience and an index of individual producers’ 
productivity in producing canola.  Section 5.1 discusses the data used in the 
empirical analysis conducted in this chapter.   
Another important factor in the adoption decision – which is not included in the 
MCIC dataset – is the yield a producer expects to obtain from the adopted 
technology.  Estimation of expected canola yields will be conducted in Section 5.2.  
The results from this estimation will then be used, along with the differentiating 
factors outlined above, in a logit model to determine each factor’s effect on the
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likelihood of adoption.  The logit analysis will be carried out in Section 5.3.  Results 
of the two stage estimation are presented in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
 
5.1 Data and Sources 
 The data used in this thesis were obtained from the producer reported 
information database of Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation (MCIC).  The data is 
collected at the individual producer level from the years 1995 through 2000.  The 
data set consists of 124,566 cross-sectional observations of yield.   
 The data required for the estimation of expected yields, given by equation 
(5.1), include the year of production, the type of technology and soil zone.  Varietal 
data is used to identify technology type.  The variable representing the technology 
type receives a one for each yield estimate that corresponds to a herbicide tolerant 
variety, and a zero otherwise.  In 2004, there are approximately 294 canola varieties 
registered for use in Canada. 
When the data from MCIC were initially analyzed in the OLS regression for 
estimated yield, it was found that certain varieties were strongly statistically 
significant.  Upon further inspection of the data it was found that these varieties 
were, in fact, outliers – varieties with very few observations with uncommonly high 
(or low) yield observations attached to them.  To ensure that these outliers did not 
bias the results, varieties with observations less than the mean number of 
observations per variety were eliminated.4  Given the large number of observations 
available, removal of these varieties should not compromise the integrity of the 
analysis.  Thus, the model includes 51 varieties.  Varietal information is captured 
using 50 dummy variables.  A complete listing of canola varieties registered for use 
in Canada and their corresponding technology is presented in Appendix A.  Those 
varieties utilized in this thesis are indicated.   
 Soil type, as reported by Manitoba Crop Insurance, is classified on a rating 
scale of A through J.  These classifications are based on a 35-year average yield 
index for wheat, oats and barley on benchmark soils within Manitoba.  The 
                                                 
4 The mean number of observations per variety when all varieties are considered is 396.  Those 
varieties removed represent both new and old technology.   
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benchmarks are classified according to their productivity – class A being the highest 
yielding soils and class J being the lowest yielding.  For the purposes of this 
analysis, each class (with the exception of class J which is used as the reference 
class) is defined as a dummy variable in the model.   
Data for producer experience, management ability, risk aversion, producer 
expectations and gross costs are used to estimate the probability of producers 
choosing to produce HT canola.  The qualitative factors used in the estimation, 
including experience, management ability and risk aversion are estimated using 
MCIC-supplied information as proxy variables.  Producer experience is accounted 
for by using the number of years the individual has been enrolled in crop insurance 
as the proxy.  A larger number of years enrolled corresponds to a larger degree of 
experience.  Risk aversion can be measured using crop insurance coverage levels as 
the proxy.  These levels range from 50 to 80 per cent (with intermediate levels in 
increments of ten per cent) of the producer’s probable yield (as calculated by 
MCIC).  Producers who insure at higher levels (i.e., 80 per cent) are assumed to be 
more risk averse than those producers who insure at lower levels.  Management 
ability is explained through each producer’s canola productivity index (CPI), as 
calculated by MCIC.  The CPI is an annual productivity index of an individual’s 
canola yield, expressed as a percentage of the average of the risk area in which he 
resides.5  An individual’s productivity index is averaged using a maximum of the 10 
most recent years of available production data.6  For each soil zone, the individual’s 
index (individual yield as percentage of area average) is averaged across his 
reported acres for that soil zone.  The result is a weighted annual index, by crop.  
The CPI (specific to canola) and IPI (a more generalized index calculated for 
individuals across all commodities) are unique calculations to Manitoba Crop 
Insurance Corporation, derived from a producer’s Harvested Production Report.  
                                                 
5 Manitoba Crop Insurance (2001b) defines a risk area as an area of common production risk.  Areas 
with similar soils and/or climates are placed within the same group. 
6 Using a maximum of ten years of available production data is consistent with how crop insurance 
calculates insurable yields, and takes into consideration the change that cropping technology, such as 
the introduction of zero tillage, will have on productivity. 
 47
The gross costs used in the estimation of the model are the manufacturer’s 
suggested retail prices (SRP) as given in Table 2.2.  Chemical SRPs were obtained 
from Saskatchewan Agriculture Food and Rural Revitalization’s annual publication 
Guide to Crop Protection.7  The suggested retail prices for seed were obtained as 
quotes from seed dealers.  Many of the SRPs for both chemical and seed are 
reported on a per unit basis, and are therefore converted to a per acre basis for the 
analysis.   Seeding rates are those suggested by the Canola Council of Canada 
(2001) for each system.  Chemical application rates used in the calculation of 
chemical costs are those suggested by Saskatchewan Agriculture Food and Rural 
Revitalization (2004).  The chemical application rates are assumed constant across 
years.  The prices of seed and chemical, however, are variable from year to year as 
new product becomes available, and as weed control requirements change.  
Averaged chemical costs from the data reported in Table 2.2 will be used in the 
analysis, and are based on the manufacturers’ suggested retail price for the specific 
variety of canola under analysis.   
 
5.2 Regression Model for Estimating Expected Yields 
This section develops an empirical model to determine expected yields of 
canola.  Per acre yield can be expected to be a function of factors such as soil type, 
year of production, the technology (i.e., HT) and variety.  Variety information is an 
important factor to consider, as it allows examination of yield differences between 
varieties, as well as between HT and non-HT canola.  
The model to estimate per acre expected yield is specified as a linear 
function of the form: 
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7 While the prices used in the analysis are from a Saskatchewan publication, they are the 
manufacturers’ suggested retail prices, which are comparable across the Prairie Provinces. 
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where y is yield,  are dummy variables denoting soil zone; 
 are dummy variables indicating the year in which the yield 
observations were obtained; 
( 9,...,1=szDsz )
)( 5,...,1=yrDyr
( ) ( )9,...,1, =⋅ szhtDD szht  and 
( ) ( 5,...,1, =⋅ yrhtDD yrht ) are the interaction terms between HT and soil zone and 
year, respectively; and, ( )50,...,1=vDv  is a varietal dummy variable. 
The model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).  Excel canola (a 
non-HT variety) in the J soil zone of Manitoba in 1995 is the base to which all other 
estimates of yield are relative.   
There are other variables that will affect the yield of canola that are not 
specifically included in the model to estimate expected yield.  Primary factors that 
have been omitted from the model include weather (i.e., precipitation) and the type 
of tillage system used (i.e., conventional vs. zero-tillage).  A producer’s choice to 
fertilize more or less intensively, and the choice and application rate of chemicals 
are endogenous variables that are not explicitly stated in the model, but may be 
captured in a producer’s management profile.    
 
5.3 Regression Model for Estimating the Probability of Adoption 
The second stage of estimation examines the probability that an individual 
producer will adopt HT canola.  A producer’s decision to adopt HT canola is 
influenced by many factors including the individual’s experience, risk profile, 
productivity and expectations on the performance of the technology.   
Since the decision to adopt is a discrete choice, an estimation of the 
probability of adoption is dependent on the nature of the error term contained in the 
analysis (recall equation 4.5).  There are several types of limited dependent variable 
models that can be used, depending on how the error term is assumed to be 
distributed.  In the case where the error term is assumed to be logistically 
distributed, the model can be estimated using logit analysis, as is done here.  
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The logit model is applied to: 
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     (5.2) 
where zit is a limited dependent variable that receives a 1 for HT and a 0 for non-HT 
production; xrisk is a crop insurance coverage level representing risk aversion; xexp is 
the number of years a producer has been enrolled in crop insurance and is used as an 
experience proxy; xmgt is the producer’s canola productivity index (CPI), a proxy for 
management ability; xexpyld is the expected yield of canola estimated from Stage 1 of 
the analysis, as per Section 5.2 ; and xcost represents the gross cost (encompassing 
the cost of seed, chemical and the TUA) for a specific canola system.  DY  
(Y=1,…,5) are dummy variables denoting the year corresponding to each 
observation.  The terms (xrisk·DYm), (m=1,…,5); (xexp·DYn) (n=1,…,5); (xmgt·DYr) 
(r=1,…,5); (xexpyld ·DYt) (t=1,…,5); and (xcost·DYv) (v=1,…,5) are interaction terms 
between year and the variable for risk, experience, management, expected yield and 
cost, respectively.  The term iε  is a logistically distributed error term. 
 The model is estimated using binary logit estimation.  All results of the 
regression on the probability of adopting HT canola are compared to the base year, 
1995.   
Since the coefficients calculated in the logit regression do not have the same 
interpretation as the marginal effect, or slope, in a linear regression, the marginal 
effect of each of the independent variables must be calculated.  The marginal effect 
shows the effect of a change in a regressor on the probability of producers adopting 
HT technology.  Following Greene (2000), this effect can be determined by 
       
[ ] ( )
( ) ( )ββββ
β xf
xd
xdF
x
xyE
'
'
' =⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧=∂
∂
.                           (5.3) 
Berndt (1991) indicates that, for estimates of a logit model, ( )⋅f  is closely 
approximated by the ratio ( )PP −1 , where P is the proportion of adopters.  Thus, 
the marginal effects are given by 
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x
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∂
1                                         (5.4) 
This equation, however, does not apply to calculating interaction effects in discrete 
choice models.  Following the work of Norton, Wang and Ai (2004), the interaction 
effect in discrete choice models is determined by 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) (( )[ ]uFuFuFxxuFuF
xx
uF 2111 1122212112
21
−−+++−=∂∂
∂ βββββ )   (5.5) 
where 12β  is the coefficient of the interaction term and F(u) (the cumulative density 
function) is closely approximated by P, the proportion of HT observations in the 
sample.8   
 
5.4 Yield Estimation Results 
Equation (5.1) is estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method 
provided by Eviews.  The results from the yield estimation are shown in Table 5.1.  
The estimate for the constant, α, is statistically significant at the five per cent level.  
All estimates for soil type are statistically significant at the five per cent level, and 
are positive, indicating that each soil type positively affects the yield of canola, from 
approximately two bushel per acre to 12 bushel per acre over the J soil type.  The 
coefficients decrease from A to J, indicating consistency with the description of soil 
classification in the previous section – i.e., A soils are the most productive, while J 
soils are least productive.  All of the HT-soil interaction terms are negative, 
indicating that the HT technology and soil type interact to decrease yields relative to 
the base yield.  All but one of these interaction terms are statistically significant 
(seven are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and one at the ten per cent 
level). 
                                                 
8 For the case where one continuous variable is interacted with a dummy variable, as is the case in 
this thesis, another much more complicated formula exists.  However, due to time limitations and 
difficulty in using this formula the standard formula provided is used.  Please see Norton, Wang and 
Ai (2003) for more detail about this formula, which provides a more accurate approximation of the 
interaction effect when one continuous and one dummy variable interact. 
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Each of the year estimates are statistically significant, while only three of the 
five interaction estimates between HT and year are statistically significant – two at 
the five per cent level and one at the ten per cent level.  All but three of the variety 
estimates – those for Vanguard, Bullet and Trojan – are statistically significant at 
either the five or ten per cent levels.  Of the 50 varieties in the estimation, only four 
are negative, indicating that 46 varieties have a yield advantage over Excel canola in 
the J soil zone. 
The results of this analysis can be used to compare varieties for the same 
location, during the same production year.  To obtain the predicted yields for use in 
these comparisons, the coefficients of interest are added together.  For example, the 
expected yield for Innovator (a HT canola) in the D soil in 1998, is 26.98 bushels 
per acre, while the expected yield for Hyola 401 (a non-HT hybrid canola) in the 
same year and soil type is 34.44 bushels per acre.  In this case, the non-HT variety 
has a higher expected yield than the HT variety. 
To account for varietal influence on yield, comparisons can be made 
between specific HT and non-HT varieties.  Twelve varieties, six non-HT and six 
HT – two from each type of HT system - were chosen for analysis.  The varieties 
chosen were the most widely used in Manitoba as determined by the number of 
observations of each variety in the data-set.  Figure 5.1 summarizes six expected 
yield comparisons between non-HT and HT varieties for all soil zones (A to J) for 
the years 1995 through 2000.  Positive values on the charts reflect a yield advantage 
for the HT variety.   
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Table 5.1 - Stage 1: OLS Estimation Results 
Variable Coefficient (t-value) Variable Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept 12.99 (18.89)*   Agassiz 9.02 (19.95)*
Year     Arrow 6.67 (6.46)*
  1996 7.10 (57.8)*   Bounty -1.85 (-4.28)*
  1997 1.69 (13.11)*   Bullet -0.51 (-1.35) 
  1998 3.85 (27.42)*   Conquest 9.65 (26.78)*
  1999 6.70 (42.6)*   Coronet 4.03 (12.43)*
  2000 0.46 (2.71)*   Crusher 3.70 (17.41)*
Soil Zone     Cyclone 1.94 (5.40)*
  A 12.19 (16.07)*   Defender 3.91 (14.33)*
  B 7.48 (10.92)*   Dynamite 4.81 (16.14)*
  C 9.45 (13.93)*   Ebony 8.08 (39.09)*
  D 8.63 (12.72)*   Elect 2.20 (5.68)*
  E 6.84 (10.09)*   Exceed 6.45 (6.17)*
  F 5.73 (8.41)*   Garrison 1.25 (5.30)*
  G 5.65 (8.22)*   Global 7.39 (21.02)*
  H 3.94 (5.62)*   Hudson 4.26 (11.77)*
  I 1.94 (2.55)*   Hyola 401 8.14 (48.9)*
HT-Year       Impact 2.21 (6.85)*
  HT-1996 -0.85 (-1.78)   Independence 6.29 (6.07)*
  HT-1997 -0.05 (-0.10)   Innovator 5.71 (5.58)*
  HT-1998 -1.82 (-3.89)*   Invigor 2153 11.59 (11.26)*
  HT-1999 -1.83 (-3.84)*   Invigor 2273 12.62 (12.28)*
  HT-2000 0.40 (0.82)   Jewel 4.15 (14.03)*
HT-Soil     Legacy 2.15 (10.8)*
  HT-A -2.08 (-1.99)*   Legend -0.71 (-2.18)*
  HT-B -1.44 (-1.56)   LG3235 11.62 (11.18)*
  HT-C -2.68 (-2.95)*   LG3295 8.60 (8.33)*
  HT-D -2.38 (-2.62)*   LG3310 7.30 (21.27)*
  HT-E -2.45 (-2.70)*   LG3345 10.34 (9.59)*
  HT-F -2.25 (-2.47)*   LG3455 8.62 (21.87)*
  HT-G -2.48 (-2.70)*   Magnum 2.89 (6.65)*
  HT-H -2.79 (-2.97)*   PGS 3850 10.55 (10.21)*
  HT-I -1.89 (-1.86)   PGS 3880 11.61 (10.97)*
Variety     Profit -3.43 (-5.95)*
  44A89 2.98 (6.43)*   Promark 6.58 (19.33)*
  45A50 8.91 (8.08)*   Q2 5.29 (13.62)*
  45A51 10.61 (10.29)*   Quantum 3.54 (19.35)*
  45A71 7.44 (7.34)*   Quest  9.56 (9.36)*
  46A05 2.10 (6.52)*   Stallion 4.34 (4.47)*
  46A65 8.09 (41.88)*   Trojan -0.14 (-0.39) 
  46A72 7.44 (7.10)*   Vanguard 0.30 (0.94) 
  46A73 9.80 (9.26)*    
  46A74 9.41 (8.51)*
  46A76 13.43 (12.92)*
N = 124,566 
Adj. R2 = 0.202 
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Panel (a) in Figure 5.1 shows the comparison between Liberty Link® (LL) 
Invigor 2273 and a non-HT hybrid variety, Hyola 401.  The LL variety has a yield 
advantage in nearly all years and soil zones with the exception of the H soil zone in 
both 1998 and 1999.  Clearfield® (CL) 45A71 is outyielded by the non-HT variety 
Global in panel (b), except for the 2000 crop year in the J soil zone.  Panel (c) 
shows a yield advantage for non-HT Conquest in all soil zones in all years over the 
Liberty Link® variety Independence.  This is the only comparison in which a non-
HT variety always yields better than the HT variety under comparison.  Roundup 
Ready® (RR) LG3235 exhibits varying yield advantages over non-HT Agassiz 
across both soil zones and crop years.  The one comparison in which the HT variety 
outyields the non-HT variety in all soil zones, over all years is shown in panel (e) – 
Clearfield® 46A76 compared with non-HT Ebony.  The comparison between RR 
Quest and non-HT 46A65 in panel (f) exhibits much the same results as panel (d), in 
which neither variety dominates all of the time.   
The comparisons in Figure 5.1 are representative of the performance of each 
HT variety in comparison with the other non-HT varieties under consideration.  
Several observations can be made from these comparisons.  First, the conventional 
varieties performed better in 1998 and 1999.  In the comparisons where there is an 
HT advantage, the advantage seems to be smaller for those two years within a given 
soil zone.  When the non-HT variety is shown to have a yield advantage in 1998 or 
1999, the advantage seems to be larger than the advantage is in other years for the 
same soil zone. 
Second, HT canola performed better in 2000.  Consider panels (b), (d) and 
(f).  For the soil zones where there is a yield advantage displayed, the advantage 
most often occurs in the 2000 crop year.  Third, HT varieties seem to perform better 
in the extreme soil zones (i.e., A and J), while non-HT varieties do better in the mid-
range soils.  This third observation is consistent with the assumption that lower-
productive land (i.e., the J soil) may have higher weed infestations, and the HT 
varieties perform better with the ability to non-selectively control weeds in-crop.  
The more productive A soils may tend to be colder and more difficult to get onto 
earlier in the spring for pre-seeding weed control.  Again, the ability to non-
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selectively control weeds in-crop in this instance would lend to the better 
performance of HT varieties. 
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(e) (f)  Note: Positive values indicate HT yield advantageFigure 5.1 - Yield Differences Across Soil Zones, Selected Varieties, 1995-2000 
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 Table 5.2 depicts the statistical significance of the yield comparisons shown 
in Figure 5.1.  To test for statistical significance, a Wald coefficient restriction was 
placed on the yield comparisons.  Specifically, the following null hypothesis was 
tested: 
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Where 10,...,1, =iiβ represents the coefficient corresponding to the soil zone in 
which the yields are being compared; 6,...,1, =jjδ is the coefficient corresponding 
to the year in which the comparison takes place; γ represents the interaction 
coefficient between the HT technology and soil zone; η  is the interaction 
coefficient between the HT technology and year; and,  and represent the 
coefficients corresponding, respectively, to the HT and non-HT variety being 
compared.  The restriction tests whether the expected yield estimate for HT canola – 
the left hand side of the equation – is equal to the expected yield estimate for non-
HT canola – the right hand side of the equation.   The restrictions can be reduced to: 
1v 2v
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While the alternative hypothesis is: 
HA:       6,...,1
.
.
.
21
21
21
10
2
1
=
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎬
⎫
≠++
≠++
≠++
j
vvj
vvj
vvj
λληγ
λληγ
λληγ
 
The reported values allow a test of the hypothesis that the expected yield 
differences for all soil zones in any given year are equal to zero.  The critical F 
value at the five per cent confidence level for 124,566 observations and ten 
restrictions is 1.83.  From Table 5.2 it is clear that all yield differences are 
statistically significant at the five per cent level.  The conclusion to draw from these 
results is that yield differences appear to exist between HT and non-HT varieties.   
 
Table 5.2 - Statistical Significance of Yield Differences, Selected Varieties, 1995-2000. 
Year 
LL 
Independence 
versus 
Conquest 
LL Invigor 
2273     
versus   
Hyola 401 
RR Quest 
versus 
46A65 
RR LG3235 
versus 
Agassiz 
CF 46A76 
versus 
Ebony 
CF 45A71 
versus 
Global 
 F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
1995 14.25 * 6.21 * 5.35 * 5.22 * 8.17 * 6.83 * 
1996 26.9 * 6.99 * 9.56 * 5.12 * 9.01 * 11.82 * 
1997 26.19 * 14.13 * 7.62 * 5.22 * 15.72 * 9.29 * 
1998 40.7 * 5.13 * 34.89 * 6.59 * 6.76 * 18.23 * 
1999 39.34 * 5.13 * 30.80 * 6.70 * 6.71 * 17.36 * 
2000 24.27 * 20.72 * 5.74 * 5.32 * 23.09 * 7.46 * 
  
* significant at 5 per cent  
Fcritical = 1.83 
K=10 
N=124,566 
 
 
To say whether or not a particular variety exhibits a yield advantage is not an 
accurate assessment of the benefit to producers from the use of one technology or 
the other.  Because of the difference in cost across the canola systems available on 
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the market, it is not simply yield, but gross returns, that determine the relative 
benefits to producers. 
Table 5.3 shows, in detail, the calculation of estimated gross returns for the 
C soil in 2000.  System costs used correspond to those reported in Table 2.2 for the 
individual variety under consideration.  Estimated yields are taken from the 
regression in stage one of the analysis.  Of the varieties being compared, the 
conventional hybrid, Hyola 401, is the most costly to produce at an estimated 
$59.34 per acre.  The least costly is the LL variety Independence at $33.10 per acre.  
For the C soil of Manitoba, CF 46A76 is the highest returning variety, followed by 
LL Invigor 2273, RR LG 3235 and the conventional variety Agassiz.   
 Table 5.3 gives a detailed example of how estimated gross returns can be 
calculated for a given soil zone.  Using this same methodology, gross returns can be 
calculated for each of the other soil zones, by canola system.  Estimated gross 
returns for each soil zone are depicted in Table 5.4 using the estimated yields for 
2000.  Note that the Clearfield 46A76 system is the highest returning system across 
all soil zones.  Similar to the comparison done for the C soil zone, the next highest 
returning systems are Invigor 2273 and LG 3235.  The ranking of the remaining 
varieties depends on soil type.  For example, Agassiz is the next highest returning 
variety in soil zone B, while Quest is the next highest returning variety in soil zone 
A.   
In the same way that yield differences between HT and non-HT varieties 
were compared in Table 5.2, the statistical significance of gross returns between 
varieties can also be compared.  Table 5.5 shows the statistical significance of the 
difference in gross returns using the same variety comparisons used in Table 5.2.  
Again, the reported values are F statistics based on Wald coefficient restrictions 
placed on the difference in gross returns between varieties.   
Specifically, the null hypothesis tested is: 
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where  are the yield estimates calculated from the regression and ( )⋅ vρ  is the system 
cost (seed, chemical and technology use fee) for the particular varieties under 
comparison.  The above restrictions can be reduced to: 
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versus the alternate hypothesis: 
 
HA: 
( )
( )
( )
6,...,1
.
.
.
2211
2211
2211
10
2
1
=
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎬
⎫
≠++
≠++
≠++
j
vvvvj
vvvvj
vvvvj
ρλρληγ
ρλρληγ
ρλρληγ
. 
The critical F value for a five per cent confidence level is 1.83.  Notice from 
Table 5.5 that all comparisons are statistically significant at the five per cent level. 
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Table 5.3 - Gross Return Comparison, Manitoba C Soil Zone, 2000. 
   Clearfield Roundup Liberty Link Conventional Open Pollinated Conv 
Hybrid 
       
  
46A76 45A71 LG 3235 Quest  Independ-
ence 
Invigor 
2273 
Agassiz Conquest Ebony Global 46A65 Hyola 401
Gross Returns 
Yield (bu/acre)             
             
         
34.1 28.1 32.2 30.2 26.9 33.2 31.9 32.6 31.0 30.3 31.0 31.1
Commodity Price ($/bu) $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  $7.00  
Expected Gross ($/acre) 
 
$238.35  
 
$196.45 
 
$225.72  
 
$211.31  
 
$188.38  
 
$232.71  
 
$223.53  
 
$227.88  
 
$216.92  
 
$212.12  
 
$217.00  
 
$217.38  
 
System Costs ($/acre)
Seed Cost  $19.80     $19.80  $19.37  $19.67   $11.00   $20.63   $7.44   $21.75   $10.54   $11.16   $ 14.88   $ 25.97  
Herbicide Cost 21.62  21.62  4.90  4.90  22.10  22.10  33.37  33.37  33.37  33.37  33.37  33.37  
TUA N/A  N/A 15.00  15.00  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Total System Cost 
 
$41.42  
 
$41.42  
 
$39.27 
 
$39.57 
 
$33.10 
 
$42.73 
 
$40.81 
 
$55.12  
 
$43.91  
 
$44.53  
 
$48.25 
 
$59.34  
 
Gross Returns ($/acre) $196.93  $155.03 $186.45  $171.74  $155.28  $189.98  $182.72  $172.75  $173.01  $167.59  $168.75  $158.05  
Source: Canola Council of Canada (2001); SAF (2001); author’s calculations.
 60
Table 5.4 - Calculated Gross Returns, dollars per acre, 2000. 
   A B C D E F G H I J
HT            
46A76           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
$234.92 $191.91 $196.93 $193.28 $180.31 $173.94 $171.74 $157.61 $149.91 $149.58
Clearfield 
45A71 $193.01 $150.00 $155.03 $151.37 $138.40 $132.03 $129.83 $115.70 $108.01 $107.67
LG 3235 $224.43 $181.43 $186.45 $182.79 $169.83 $163.45 $161.26 $147.12 $139.43 $139.09
Roundup Ready Quest $209.72 $166.72 $171.74 $168.08 $155.11 $148.74 $146.54 $132.41 $124.72 $124.38
Independence $193.27 $150.26 $155.28 $151.62 $138.66 $132.29 $130.09 $115.96 $108.26 $107.93
Liberty Link Invigor 2273 $227.97 $184.96 $189.98 $186.33 $173.36 $166.99 $164.79 $150.66 $142.96 $142.63
Non-HT 
Agassiz $201.91 $168.95 $182.72 $176.95 $164.47 $156.70 $156.09 $144.17 $130.14 $116.57
Conquest $191.94 $158.99 $172.75 $166.99 $154.50 $146.74 $146.13 $134.20 $120.17 $106.60
Ebony $192.20 $159.24 $173.01 $167.24 $154.76 $146.99 $146.38 $134.46 $120.43 $106.86
Global $186.78 $153.82 $167.59 $161.82 $149.34 $141.57 $140.96 $129.04 $115.01 $101.44
Conventional 
Open 
Pollinated 
46A65 $187.94 $154.98 $168.75 $162.98 $150.50 $142.74 $142.12 $130.20 $116.17 $102.60
Conventional 
Hybrid 
Hyola 401 $177.23 $144.28 $158.05 $152.28 $139.79 $132.03 $131.42 $119.50 $105.47 $91.90
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 5.5 - Statisitical Significance of Gross Returns, Selected Varieties, 1995-2000. 
Year 
LL 
Independence 
versus 
Conquest 
LL Invigor 
2273 versus 
Hyola 401 
RR Quest 
versus  
46A65 
RR LG3235 
versus 
Agassiz 
CF 46A76 
versus 
Ebony 
CF 45A71 
versus 
 Global 
 F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat 
Sig. 
F 
value 
Stat. 
Sig. 
1995 14.13 * 5.18 * 6.43 * 5.06 * 6.14 * 9.1 * 
1996 26.37 * 5.23 * 14.99 * 5.97 * 6.23 * 17.45 * 
1997 25.37 * 6.05 * 14.35 * 6.12 * 8.93 * 14.16 * 
1998 40.90 * 8.57 * 57.43 * 8.37 * 5.83 * 26.82 * 
1999 39.29 * 8.89 * 49.93 * 8.66 * 5.82 * 25.24 * 
2000 23.59 * 8.33 * 10.23 * 4.69 * 12.74 * 10.79 * 
 
 
* significant at 5 per cent  
 
K=10 
N=124,566 
 
Source: Eviews 
  
5.5 Logit Model Estimation 
Adoption of HT canola was estimated using the binary logit estimation 
program provided by Eviews.  The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5.6.    
Each of the variables for risk aversion, management, experience, expected yield and 
system cost are estimated in interaction with dummy variables for year to account 
for the effect of time on the probability of adopting HT canola.  The base year (i.e., 
the year dummy omitted from the analysis) is 1995.   
The parameters of a logit analysis cannot be interpreted in the same way as 
in linear regressions, as they are not a measure of the marginal effect of the 
parameter on the dependent variable.  Further, as noted by Norton, Wang and Ai 
(2004), the sign on the calculated interaction term may be different than the sign on 
the estimated coefficient for the interaction term.  Therefore, slopes are calculated to 
determine the marginal effect each variable has on the probability of adoption.  The 
formula for the calculation of the marginal effects is shown in equation 5.4.  For this 
analysis, the marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the data.  
Alternatively, the marginal effect could be calculated at each individual observation, 
and the average of the marginal effects used.  As Greene (2000) notes, because the 
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functions are continuous, for large samples (as is the case here) these two methods 
will yield the same results.  The marginal, or slope, effects for each variable are 
found by multiplying the estimated coefficients ( )βˆ  by the term P(1-P), where P is 
the proportion of HT observations to the entire sample (Berndt 1991).  The slope 
effects of the interaction terms are found by employing equation 5.5.  The results of 
these calculations are summarized in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6 - Stage 2: Logit Regression Results and Calculated Marginal Effects 
Variable Estimated Coefficient 
Calculated Marginal 
Effect 
C 136.0809 136.0809 
RISKLEVEL 0.0062 0.0015 
EXPERIENCE -0.0309 -0.0077 
MANAGEMENT 1.2039 0.2978 
EXPECTYLD 1.6484 0.4077 
SYSTEMCOST -4.3329 -1.0717 
Y96 -7.0815 -1.7515 
Y97 38.564 9.5381 
Y98 20.1502 4.9838 
Y99 -81.8827 -20.2521 
Y2000 -115.0782 -28.4624 
RISK96 -0.0202 -0.0059 
RISK97 -0.0289 -0.0062 
RISK98 -0.0189 -0.0035 
RISK99 -0.0136 -0.0113 
RISK2000 -0.0129 0.0133 
EXPERI96 0.0354 -0.0270 
EXPERI97 0.0085 -0.0105 
EXPERI98 0.0160 0.0600 
EXPERI99 0.0316 -0.1538 
EXPERI2000 0.0255 1.9516 
MANAGE96 0.2467 0.8418 
MANAGE97 1.6544 -2.4782 
MANAGE98 0.5715 -1.1548 
MANAGE99 -0.3805 0.9302 
MANAGE2000 -1.0671 -0.4740 
EXPYLD96 -0.6091 -4.8189 
EXPYLD97 -0.4355 -1.2614 
EXPYLD98 -0.9174 -1.4950 
EXPYLD99 -1.5634 -2.9711 
EXPYLD2000 -1.4203 -4.2793 
COST96 0.4419 -0.0156 
COST97 -0.6019 0.0851 
COST98 0.1636 -3.3366 
COST99 3.020 -6.0451 
COST2000 3.705 -3.8036 
Source: Eviews; author’s calculations 
 
As hypothesized by Norton, Wang and Ai (2004), the signs on several of the 
interaction terms have changed.  Those terms are shaded in Table 5.6.  As 
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mentioned earlier, the coefficients on RISKLEVEL, EXPERIENCE, 
MANAGEMENT, EXPECTYLD and SYSTEMCOST represent the effect each of 
these characteristics has on producers’ probability of adopting HT canola in 1995.   
 The calculated marginal effects show several interesting results.  First, as a 
producer’s crop insurance coverage level – or level of risk aversion – increases, the 
results indicate that he is less likely to adopt HT canola, except in 1995 and 2000.  
This result could indicate that, in the initial year of adoption, producers viewed HT 
canola as more risky than non-HT canola and thus were less likely to adopt it the 
more risk averse they were.  As experience with the technology increased, producers 
may have become more comfortable with the performance of the technology, and in 
fact found that it reduced their risk rather than increased it.  Second, the results 
show that in 1995 the probability of adopting is smaller the more experience a 
producer has.  Over time, this inverse relationship exists in some years (1996, 1997 
and 1999) and not in others (1998 and 2000). 
 Those producers who are better managers (those with higher values 
associated with their CPI) were more likely to adopt when the technology was first 
introduced, as indicated by the positive values for the 1995 and 1996 management 
interaction terms.  However, stronger management ability meant less probability of 
adopting HT canola over the next four years, except in 1999.  This result is 
consistent with the idea that adoption of the technology was increasingly being 
undertaken by farmers regardless of their management ability. 
 A disturbing result is that, in all years but 1995, the probability of producers 
adopting HT canola decreases as the expectation of higher yields increases.  This 
result is contrary to basic economic intuition that states that as expected yields 
increase, producers will be more likely to adopt the technology.  Last, except for 
1997, the probability of adoption decreases as the cost of the canola system 
increases.  This result is consistent with economic theory.   
  Unfortunately, the statistical significance of the above results cannot be 
determined at this stage.  Since the logit coefficients supplied by Eviews are not the 
marginal effects, the corresponding standard errors supplied by Eviews also do not 
apply.  As pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003), the calculation of standard errors, 
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and thus the ability to test for statistical significance, is extremely difficult when 
considering interaction effects in discrete choice models.  Due to time limitations, 
the standard errors (and hence the t-statistics) have not been calculated.  The result 
is that the thesis is unable to determine the robustness of the results discussed above. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 The conceptual framework developed in Chapter 4 to examine the adoption 
of HT canola when producers are assumed to be heterogeneous is empirically tested 
in this chapter.  The empirical application consists of a two stage analysis.  Stage 
one estimates expected yields, which are assumed to be an important factor that 
producers consider prior to adopting a new technology.  This estimation is 
conducted as a linear regression.  The results of this analysis were then used in an 
estimation of the gross returns to producers as a measure of the benefit from 
adopting HT canola.   
Stage two of the analysis considers the expected yields calculated in Stage one, 
as well as variables representing producers’ risk attitudes, experience, management 
capabilities and canola system costs as factors in a logit regression to determine the 
probability of HT canola adoption.   Data for both analyses were obtained from 
Manitoba Crop Insurance for the years 1995 to 2000. 
 The results from stage one are highly statistically significant; they show that 
the HT Clearfield varieties potentially have the highest returns of the varieties under 
analysis.  Two important points must be considered for these results to hold.  First, 
the results are dependent on the price of the individual systems.  Second, if 
producers do not use the full spectrum of chemicals on non-HT canola, then the 
relative costs of these systems will decrease. 
 Stage two results show, primarily, that over time the probability of adopting 
HT canola diminishes.  For the most part, producers’ risk profile, expectations on 
yield and the cost of the canola system have a negative impact on the probability of 
adoption.  Experience has a negative impact on the probability of adoption in four 
out of six years, while management positively affects the probability of adoption 
half of the time.  These results suggest that the probability of adoption is influenced 
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by the characteristics of producers.  However, due to time limitations and the 
complicated nature of the calculation of standard errors, these results cannot be 
tested statistically. 
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study develops a conceptual framework to determine the probability of 
adopting HT canola when producers are assumed heterogeneous.  The model is 
based on the framework developed by Fulton and Keyowski (1999), but is modified 
from a deterministic model to a probabilistic model.  The study also considers the 
gross returns from adopting HT canola.  Canola production in Manitoba, Canada is 
chosen as the region of analysis for the empirical component of the study.  This 
chapter summarizes the major findings, specifies some implications of the study, 
and suggests areas in which the study is limited.   
 
6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
 Chapter 2 presents a description of canola producers in Manitoba, Canada.  
Manitoba is the third largest canola producing province in Canada.  In 2002, 74 per 
cent of total canola acres in Manitoba were devoted to HT canola production.  
Several factors, such as soil type, producer risk profile, experience, productivity, 
and management ability are considered as potentially determining adopters of HT 
technology from non-adopters.  An assessment of data from Manitoba Crop 
Insurance indicates that producers who have been enrolled in crop insurance for 
between eleven and thirty years and who farm in the more productive I or J soil 
zones of Manitoba are more likely to adopt HT canola.  Those producers who adopt 
are also more likely to have a lower canola productivity index than non-HT canola 
producers, and will likely insure their crops for between 50 and 70 per cent 
coverage.  
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 Chapter 3 reviews literature regarding adoption and diffusion of new 
technologies.  Mansfield (1961) suggested adoption occurred as a result of 
imitation, under the assumption that producers are homogeneous.  David (1979) and 
others suggested that there is a threshold at any point in time which will determine if 
an individual will adopt or not adopt a technology.  The threshold is determined by 
assuming that producers are heterogeneous, and that they adopt new technology at 
the correct time to maximize their objective function, given their particular mix of 
characteristics.   
Heiman et al. (2000) suggest that the imitation model may, in fact, be an 
impetus of adoption to occur, and prompts diffusion of the technology to occur as 
more producers observe others with the technology.  Ghadim and Pannell (1999) 
extend this discussion by further suggesting that learning by doing and changing 
producer perception of technology as a result of learning will further induce 
diffusion of an innovation.   
Traditionally, studies estimating the returns to canola research were 
conducted in a setting where the research effort was conducted in a public 
environment.  Subsequently, the technologies derived through these means were 
supplied competitively to the producer.  Works by Nagy and Furtan (1978), Ulrich 
et al. (1984) and Ulrich and Furtan (1985) were the first to assess the impact of 
returns to canola breeding.  These studies found that producers stood to gain 
between sixty-five and seventy per cent of the approximately fifty per cent rate of 
return made on public canola breeding.  
Fulton (1997) and Moschini and Lapan (1997) discuss how the introduction 
of intellectual property rights has the ability to create oligopolistic industries which 
provide technologies at non-competitive prices – exactly what has happened with 
the patenting of canola genes made resistant to particular chemicals.  Moschini and 
Lapan (1997) develop a model which accounts for the change in technology 
distribution from public to private sectors; specifically, the model shows how the 
analysis of benefits from the introduction of an innovation changes under a scenario 
where the innovation is supplied by an imperfectly competitive market.   
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Moschini et al. (2000), Falck-Zepeda et al. (2000a) and Falck-Zepeda et al. 
(2000b) apply the framework developed by Moschini and Lapan (1997) to assess 
the benefits accruing to producers from adopting Roundup Ready soybeans and Bt 
cotton in the United States.  Each of the studies found that the welfare of domestic 
US producers increased due to the introduction and adoption of the technologies.   
Based on an assessment of data in Chapter 2 which shows the incomplete 
adoption of HT technology in Manitoba, a model is developed in Chapter 4 which 
considers adoption of a new technology as a function of the characteristics of the 
adopters.  The model is developed from previous works conducted on the adoption 
of new innovations by Mansfield (1961), David (1975) and Heiman et al. (2000), as 
well as the conceptual model suggested by Fulton and Keyowski (1999).  The model 
developed in Chapter 4 extends the deterministic nature of the Fulton and Keyowski 
(1999) model to one that considers the probability of adoption.   
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter 4 is applied to the adoption 
of HT canola in Manitoba in Chapter 5.  The empirical model is a two-fold 
estimation.  The first stage estimates the expected yields of different canola 
varieties; these are then used to determine whether producers realize a benefit from 
the adoption of HT varieties.  The second stage considers different attributes of 
producers – such as risk aversion, management ability and productivity – along with 
expected yields over time to determine the probability that producers will adopt the 
technology.  The results show that (1) certain varieties can be shown to give 
producers higher returns; (2) the probability of adopting HT canola diminishes over 
time, and (3) differentiating characteristics of producers are key in determining the 
likelihood of adoption of HT canola. 
 
6.2 Implications of this Study 
 There are several implications to be drawn from this study.  First, the 
amount that producers benefit from the adoption of HT canola is dependent on the 
price of the technology.  Since HT canola is typically supplied non-competitively, 
input suppliers have the ability to price new technologies such that the cost saving 
benefit is offset to some degree. 
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Second, adoption of HT canola is not only dependent on the price of the 
respective technologies, but also on the heterogeneous nature of producers.  
Producers within specific spectrums of attributes consisting of location, risk 
aversion and management ability are more likely to adopt the technology than those 
who do not have the same set of characteristics. 
 
6.3 Limitations of this Study 
 There are several limitations to this thesis.  First, the inability to calculate the 
standard errors due to time constraints does not allow the calculated marginal effects 
of the logit model to be tested statistically.  A key element of future research should 
be the calculation of the standard errors, which will allow a determination of the 
statistical significance of the results reported in Chapter 5.  
Second, exogenous variables such as weather and type of tillage system 
employed, and endogenous variables such as fertilizing intensity were omitted from 
the model estimating expected canola yields.  The omission of any of these variables 
may have caused bias in the results, as each is an important factor in an individual 
producer’s decision to adopt a new technology. 
 Third, the most recent data utilized in this thesis represents the 2000 crop 
year.  Data are available up to and including the 2003 crop year.  Since this thesis 
considers the adoption of HT technology in canola from the beginning, the 
additional three years of data which are not incorporated in this analysis would 
provide a more full representation of the adoption process. 
 Last, the thesis does not consider either field trial information on new 
varieties or the timing of varieties becoming available for commercial use.  These 
factors may influence the adoption decision.  For example, how many producers 
adopt a new variety in the first year it is available?  How do field trial yields affect a 
producer’s decision to adopt the variety when it first becomes available and in 
subsequent years?  The incorporation of field trial data and timing of variety 
adoption information into the model of adoption are important topics for future 
work.   
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APPENDIX 
 
2002 Registered Conventional Canola Varieties 
41P55 Crusher Hyola 401 Millenium 
44A89 Cyclone Hyola 402 Minot 
45A02 Defender Hyola 420 Neptune 
46A05 Delta  Hypertar NEX 500 
46A40 DMS  100 Hysyn 110 Norseman 
46A65 Dynamite Hysyn 111 Optimum 
AC Parkland Eagle Hysyn 120 CS Pearl 
AC Sunshine Ebony IMC 02 Princeton 
AC-H102 Eldorado IMC 03 Profit 
Agassiz Elect IMC 105 Promark 220 
Allons Excel IMC140 Q 2 
Apollo Fairview Impact Quantum 
B2416 Frontier Impulse Reward 
Battleford Garrison Jewel Springfield 
Beacon Global Klondike Sprint 
Bounty Goldrush LA 161 Tobin 
Bullet Goliath LA 269 Tristar 
Cash HCN 28 Legacy Valleyview 
Castor HL99 Legend Vanguard 
Celebra Holly LG 3220 Westar 
Chinook Horizon LG 3310 Westwin 
Clavet Hudson Magnum WILDCAT 
Colt Hylite Maverick  
Coronet Hyola Mercury  
 
 
2002 Registered Herbicide Tolerant Canola Varieties 
2473 Exceed LG 3235 Polo 
2631LL Hysyn 101 RR LG 3295 Quest 
45A50 Independence LG 3345 Seville 
45A51 Innovator LG 3360 Stallion 
45A71 Invigor 2063 LG 3369 SW Arrow 
46A72 Invigor 2153 LG 3930 SW Rider 
46A73 Invigor 2163 LG DAWN Trojan 
46A74 Invigor 2273 PGS 3850  
46A76 Invigor 2473 PGS 3880  
 
 78
